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Articles
THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF SOLIDARITY: REGULATING
THE ROLES OF LAWYERS FOR CLIENTS ACCUSED
OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
PETER MARGULIES*
INTRODUCTION
For American lawyers, solidarity with clients is both a virtue and
vice. Finding some shared stake with a client is crucial, especially
when the state has charged a client with a horrific crime. The attor-
ney-client relationship, protected by both evidentiary privilege and
the Sixth Amendment, depends on the development of a "relation-
ship of trust."' In developing this bond, lawyers give life to the pre-
sumption of innocence and the entire structure of constitutional
protections undergirding the criminal justice system.2 Solidarity, how-
ever, is far from an unalloyed virtue. A lawyer who cultivates an unre-
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Colum-
bia Law School. I thank Bruce Green, Gerry Neuman, Dan Richman, Abbe Smith, Ian
Weinstein, and David Zlotnick for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Laura Mansnerus, Fine Line in Indictment: Defense vs. Complicity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 2002, at A23 (quoting indicted attorney Lynne Stewart). See generally Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv.
1239, 1271-75 (1993) (discussing the defense lawyer's need for empathy with the accused
in order to understand the client's needs).
2. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1993)
(discussing the importance of zealous and aggressive representation in criminal defense);
Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do
Terrible Things, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 925 (2000) (same). But see William H. Simon, The Ethics
of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1703-06 (1993) (arguing that canons of ethics
should bar criminal defense lawyers from aggressively questioning witnesses that lawyers
believe to a reasonable degree of certainty are telling the truth).
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served solidarity may compromise her client's interests or become
complicitous in ongoing crimes.3 To avoid these pitfalls, a lawyer
must be reflective about solidarity and its risks. The stakes are highest
for lawyers who represent clients accused of terrorist activity.4
The dilemma of solidarity figures prominently in the recent in-
dictment of Lynne Stewart, an attorney for the convicted terrorist,
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.5 The Government charged Ms. Stewart
with providing material support for a designated terrorist organiza-
tion by allegedly facilitating communication regarding terrorist activi-
ties between Abdel Rahman and his organization, the Gama'a
al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Group, and with defrauding and making false
statements to the government regarding these communications.6 The
prosecution of Lynne Stewart illustrates the shifting boundary be-
tween virtuous and problematic varieties of solidarity in an age of
terrorism.
In this Article, I argue that solidarity with clients is not a unitary
concept, but instead a concatenation of three sometimes conflicting
stances-affective, positional, and operational solidarity. Affective sol-
idarity encompasses the bonds of empathy and trust in the attorney-
client relationship. Positional solidarity evokes the lawyer's commit-
ment to a client's political, social, or economic goals. Operational sol-
idarity locates the lawyer as enabler of the client's ongoing activities.
Analyzing solidarity in this fashion clarifies the tensions always present
in the lawyer's attempts at solidarity, and the special challenges raised
when a lawyer represents a person or group accused of terrorist
activity.
Special challenges arise because the terrorism context blurs the
boundary between positional and operational solidarity. Consider a
3. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEAS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 66-74 (1993) (discussing the necessity of both "sympathy" and "detachment" in legal
representation and the dialectic between them). However, some feel that Kronman's indi-
vidual rather than group basis for detachment privileges the status quo. Peter Margulies,
Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1139, 1146-47 (1995) (reviewing
MILNER S. BALLY, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993) and KRONMAN, supra).
4. See MichaelJ. Glennon, Terrorism and the Limits of Law, WILSON Q., Spring 2002, at
12 (discussing reconciliation of the security and rule of law in terrorism cases).
5. See United States v. Sattar, Indictment, 02 Crim. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter
"Indictment"]. Commentators on the Stewart case have argued that it could have a chil-
ling effect on defense lawyers. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, High Noon for Ashcroft, Stewart, and the
Defense Bar, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 23, 2002, at 29 (noting the possible impact of the Stewart
case on the right to counsel). Stewart's attorney further argues that her client's constitu-
tional right to an attorney has been violated by suspected monitoring of their conversa-
tions. Patricia Hurtado, Sheik's Lawyer: Throw Out Case; Says Rights as Attorney Violated,
NEWSDAY, June 15, 2002, at A21.
6. Indictment at 9-10.
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case in which a lawyer represents the leader of a group with a history
of performing terrorist acts such as violence against civilians. In the
terrorist context, statements by the lawyer on her client's behalf re-
garding violence by the organization's members may serve not as
mere abstract advocacy, but as directives for action.7 The boundary
between positional and operational solidarity is especially porous
when the organization's agenda involves violence against broad
groups classified by nationality, ethnicity, or religion.8 The lawyer's
knowing aid in the communication of such mass terror authorizations
is a form of operational solidarity properly regulated by both profes-
sional discipline and criminal law.
Applying this principle of lawyer accountability nevertheless cre-
ates a dilemma for democracy. Legal representation plays a crucial
role in vindicating constitutional safeguards.9 In seeking to curb op-
erational solidarity, the government can so weaken the protections of
the criminal justice system that it imposes its own brand of insidious
allegiance: solidarity with the state. Any approach to regulating soli-
darity must guard against this peril.
The Article is written in five parts. Part I maps the internal logics
of affective, positional, and operational solidarity. It identifies posi-
tional allegiance as a fluid stance, sometimes motivating the lawyer to
solidify the client's trust, but on other occasions prodding the lawyer
to sell out the client's interests. Positional solidarity raises particular
problems when the lawyer's position entails the endorsement of vio-
lence. Part II first traces government efforts to disrupt the solidarity
of lawyers with clients accused of organized violence. The govern-
ment has employed gag orders, disqualification, surveillance, and
criminal prosecution to respond to attorney complicity, but has also
7. The threat of such action serves as the basis for the Department of Justice's author-
ity to monitor attorney-client communications. See Bureau of Prisons, General Manage-
ment and Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2002).
8. See infra notes 42, 128, 144 and accompanying text (discussing goals and methods
of terrorist organizations, including Kach, a right-wing Israeli group that plans and exe-
cutes attacks on Palestinians).
9. Government actions that chill lawyers' embrace of this role compound the perva-
sive problems caused by a lack of resources. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 62 (2000) (remarking that "[i]n this system,
zealous advocacy is the exception, not the rule, and it is generally better to be rich and
guilty than poor and innocent"); Bruce A. Green, Judicial Rationalizations for Rationing Jus-
tice: How Sixth Amendment Doctrine Undermines Reform, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1729, 1729, 1731
(2002) (lamenting over the quality of poor defendants' attorneys and noting that Sixth
Amendment case law reflects the notion that bad lawyering alters a case's outcome only in
the rarest of circumstances). For a discussion of strategies used by public defenders to
cope with resource scarcity, see Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional
Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419 (1996).
2003]
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used such methods to target lawyers for unpopular clients. This Part
also outlines the Government's allegations against attorney Lynne
Stewart, who is accused of complicity linked to her representation of
today's archetypal unpopular client: a convicted terrorist.
Part III focuses on the need to regulate the troubled border be-
tween positional and operational solidarity, exemplified in the signal-
ing of authorizations for mass terror at issue in the Stewart case. Part
IV analyzes three pressing legal issues in such regulation: the validity
and application of the prohibitions on material support for desig-
nated terrorist organizations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA); the legality of restraints, including monitoring,
on lawyers' communication with clients accused or convicted of ter-
rorism offenses; and, the admissibility of lawyers' prior statements of
support for violence. This Part suggests ways in which courts can en-
sure that regulation is effective in deterring lawyers' complicity and
consistent with the First Amendment, due process, and right to coun-
sel protections that preserve democracy. Finally, Part V suggests fac-
tors to guide prosecutorial discretion in regulating lawyers' roles and
suggests that nuanced regulation may actually enhance the profes-
sional judgment lawyers offer to unpopular clients.
I. SOLIDARITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Solidarity with clients has always been an attribute looked upon
with some ambivalence by the bench and bar. On the one hand, the
legal system looks askance at lawyers who expressly or inadvertently
separate themselves from their clients.' ° Venerable rules like the duty
of confidentiality exert a continuing hold because the profession views
them as necessary to promote clients' trust." Lawyers who manifest a
10. See L. Ray Patterson, The Fundamentals of Professionalism, 45 S.C. L. REv. 707, 713
(1994) (noting that attorneys collectively think that their responsibility is to their client
rather than the "legal system" or the "public at large"); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and
the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan ?, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1030, 1054 (1995) (remarking that lawyers who distance themselves from unpopular cli-
ents risk reinforcing a negative perception of their client); Frederic Dannen, Defending the
Mafia, NEW YORKER, Feb. 21, 1994, at 64 (reporting that a lawyer who represents alleged
organized crime figures, socializes with his clients to avoid reinforcing the belief that they
are subhuman).
11. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1969) (stating that the client
must feel free to discuss whatever the client wishes with the lawyer, and the lawyer must feel
free to obtain information beyond that voluntarily supplied by the client); id. (stating that
the ethical duty of confidentiality facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation and encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983) (stating that lawyer-client confidentiality encour-
ages clients to "communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or
legally damaging subject matter"). The Canons found in the Model Code express in gen-
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flagrant lack of interest in whether their client lives or dies-such as
the Texas lawyer who repeatedly fell asleep during his client's trial for
murder-trigger professional obloquy, public disdain, and judicial in-
tervention on their client's behalf. 2
On the other hand, the American legal tradition has also viewed
an excess of solidarity with suspicion. Perhaps the classic illustration
of American lawyers' detachment is by Alexis de Tocqueville, who de-
scribed lawyers as a mediating force between the populace and elites,
never fully in either camp, and able to distill the common interests of
each.l" Professional canons expressly reject the attribution of solidar-
ity with client aims or objectives, primly advising that, "[a] lawyer's
representation of a client.., does not constitute an endorsement of
the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities. '"14
eral terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers, and embody the
general concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations are de-
rived. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969). The Discipli-
nary Rules are mandatory in nature and state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Id. The Ethical Considera-
tions are aspirational in character, represent the objectives toward which lawyers should
strive, and provide guidance to lawyers in specific situations. Id. The Model Rules are
mandatory, and failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope
(1983). Recent proposals seek to allow the attorney more discretion to reveal privileged
communications. NancyJ. Moore, "In the Interests ofJustice": Balancing Client Loyalty and the
Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1776 (2002) (discussing
proposals to amend Model Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to allow disclo-
sure of otherwise confidential information to prevent "reasonably certain" death or sub-
stantial bodily harm).
12. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that a
lawyer's sleeping during trial effectively deprived defendant of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002).
13. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 266-70 (J.P. Meyer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835). For further discussion of the law-
yer's role in American society, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988) (analyzing the imagery and underlying narratives of American constitutionalism);
DAVID RAY PAPKE, HERETICS IN THE TEMPLE: AMERICANS WHO REJECT THE NATION'S LEGAL
FAITH 17-19 (1998) (discussing de Tocqueville's analysis); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Fu-
ture of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991) (discussing narratives undergirding the law-
yer's role in American democracy); Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers
and Heretics, 61 MD. L. REv. 217 (2002) (discussing conceptions of professionalism in the
practice of law).
14. See Ogletree, supra note 1, at 1249 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.2(b)). One commentator defends this premise of lawyerly detachment in the following
way:
[I]f advocates were held morally accountable for their clients' conduct, less legal
representation would be available for those most vulnerable to popular prejudice
and governmental repression. Our history provides ample illustrations of the so-
cial and economic penalties directed at attorneys with unpopular clients. It was
difficult enough to find lawyers for accused communists in the McCarthy era and
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Lawyers who identified themselves with social movements have been
the subject of ethics complaints charging them with solicitation 5 and
scholarly criticism asserting that they imposed a legalistic model un-
suited to the diverse needs of communities.' 6 A cottage industry has
developed for casting aspersions on lawyers who share a stake in their
client's financial prospects through acquisition of a contingency inter-
est in the client's recovery.' 7 At the same time, progressive critics of
the profession have remonstrated with corporate lawyers for failing to
assert sufficient independence from their clients' avarice.'a
In the face of this ambivalence, three conceptions of attorney-
client solidarity have emerged: affective, positional, and operational.
Legal practice based on a conception of solidarity can benefit clients.
However, the lawyer's failure to critically examine her practice of soli-
for political activists in the early southern civil rights campaign. Those difficulties
would have been far greater without the principle that legal representation is not
an endorsement of client conduct.
RHODE, supra note 9, at 54 (endnote omitted). Of course, a spectrum of views exist regard-
ing an attorney's feelings and conduct towards a client's morality. See Peter Margulies,
"Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the
Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 214 (1990) (arguing that lawyers are obliged to
counsel clients on issues of morality and on the interests of third parties and the public);
Russell C. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lauyers are Morally Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1805,
1808-09 (2002) (arguing that lawyers should accept the challenge of moral accountability
for clients' actions); Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Laryers, and the Virtues of Casuistry,
36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 690 (2002) (arguing for a contextual approach in which facts of
particular cases dictate when a lawyer defers to a client out of concern for client autonomy
or intervenes to protect against harsh consequences of client decisions for third parties).
15. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 L.
& HIST. REV. 97, 131-44 (2002) (discussing the ethical troubles of early NAACP lawyers and
the ways in which some leaders of the New York Bar modified their views on solicitation
and other issues to accommodate the "cause lawyering" of pioneering civil rights lawyers).
16. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (arguing that the civil rights
attorneys' "integrational ideals" may not best serve the needs of their clients); John 0.
Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of
Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1936 (1999) (asserting that a "client
community" should reject "regnant lawyers" that "attempt impact litigation, legislative or
administrative advocacy, base-building and mobilization, or other aspects of lawyering that
extend beyond resolving private disputes").
17. See, e.g., Philip J. Havers, Student Article, Take the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical
Problems of the Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 621, 625-31 (2000) (evaluating the ethical questions plaguing contingency fee ar-
rangements). But see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRAcY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAw 8 (2001) (arguing that contingency fee
arrangements help promote social change by increasing access to counsel in cases to hold
corporations accountable).
18. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988)
(quoting the former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission urging the bar
to emphasize independence from corporate clients).
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darity can also adversely affect her client and the public interest. I
discuss each brand of solidarity in turn.
A. Affective Solidarity
The legal system rightly values the lawyer's seeking to establish an
emotional bond with a client. This kind of connection has both in-
trinsic and instrumental justifications. It requires the exercise of
moral imagination, empathy, experience, and metaphor in an effort
that both acknowledges and transcends human uniqueness.' 9 Con-
nection of this kind offers the client a refuge from the uncertainty or
disdain that she encounters elsewhere in the legal system. 20 More-
over, connection promotes the client's disclosure of information that
will aid the lawyer in preparation of the case. 21 We can call this con-
nection "affective solidarity."
A lawyer displays a special strand of moral imagination when she
cultivates affective solidarity with a defendant charged with offenses
that truly shock the conscience. 22 Clarence Darrow, recalling his de-
fense of two trade unionists accused of causing a deadly fire at the Los
Angeles Times building, observed that, "[t]he lawyer, if he has a deep
sense of responsibility and warm sympathies, regards the human being
in his hands in the same light that a physician views a patient. "23
19. See PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE
OF COMMUNITY 193 (1992) (arguing for the importance of a "framework of bonding to
other persons and to person-centered activities"); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1061-66 (1992) (discussing "connection" in legal practice); see also Pe-
ter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 605, 606-07
(1999) (advocating a model of "empathetic engagement" with clients). But seeAnthony V.
Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2262 (2001) (critiquing the "facile
rhetoric of empathy and solidarity").
20. See Cahn, supra note 19, at 1064-65 (discussing the idea that lawyers should look to
the goals of a client's community when choosing who to represent in order to establish a
connection with clients).
21. See Margulies, supra note 19, at 621, 629.
22. In cases involving allegations of especially heinous crimes such as genocide or
other forms of mass murder, affective solidarity may be a challenging task for even the
most seasoned practitioner. A system that expected affective solidarity in all cases could
leave certain clients without meaningful representation. In such cases, the lawyer may fall
back on systemic rationales, such as due process or "making the government prove its
case," thatjustify zealous advocacy regardless of difficulties in empathizing with a particular
client. See Ogletree, supra note 1, at 1258 (providing several rationales for defending
criminals). Lynne Stewart's terse reply, "Prove it," to the Government's allegations that she
lent material support to terrorist activity reflects this systemic rationale. See Benjamin
Weiser & Robert F. Worth, A Nation Challenged: Indictment; Indictment Says a Lawyer Helped a
Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at Al (describing Stewart's comments after plead-
ing "not guilty" to the charges against her).
23. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF My LIFE 180 (DaCapo Press 1996) (1932).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Michael Tigar, writing about Washington v. Williams, 2 4 in which a Na-
tive American couple were convicted of negligent homicide in the
death of their child from an infection arising from a gangrenous
tooth, insists that, "the advocate must evoke the client's and the ju-
rors' human concerns. 25
Lynne Stewart, even after the Government charged her with pro-
viding material support to a terrorist organization in the course of her
representation of Sheikh Abdel Rahman, illustrated why affective soli-
darity is a lawyerly virtue. Consider the case of another one of Stew-
art's clients, Salvatore "Sammy the Bull" Gravano, whose testimony
contributed to the conviction of his former boss, the late Mafia chief-
tain John Gotti.2 6 Gravano confessed to at least nineteen murders in
the course of his testimony.27 After the Gotti trial, federal authorities
relocated Gravano in Arizona as part of the federal Witness Protection
Program.28 Seeking a career change from enforcer to entrepreneur,
Gravano started a multimillion-dollar drug ring in Arizona selling the
drug Ecstasy to teens. 29 Gravano retained Lynne Stewart, prior to her
indictment.3"
After Stewart's indictment on charges of providing material sup-
port to the Islamic Group, the Government made a motion to disqual-
ify her from continuing to represent Gravano.3 ' Gravano initially
indicated that he wanted to continue to be represented by Stewart,
but apparently expressed concern that the Government, which had
obtained a warrant to monitor conversations between Stewart and
Sheikh Abdel Rahman, had used similar methods in his case. 2 As
Stewart explained, "'Sammy being Sammy' ... he said, 'My God!
Were they listening in on us, too?"' 33
24. 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
25. See Michael E. Tigar, Voices Heard injury Argument: Litigation and the Law School Cur-
riculum, 9 REv. LITIG. 177, 190 (1990). In his mock summation, Tigar invoked Native
Americans' historic distrust of organized medicine, arguing that the defendants "did not
make a world in which when you go to the clinic, the doctors and nurses make you sit and
wait and then are cold, impersonal, and uncaring." Id. at 191.
26. William Glaberson, Gravano Keeps His Lawyer Despite Her U.S. Indictment, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2002, at B3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See William Glaberson, Mafia Turncoat Reverses Himself on Keeping His Indicted Lawyer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2002, at B5 (reporting that Gravano would no longer oppose the Gov-
ernment's motion to disqualify Lynne Stewart).
33. Glaberson, supra note 26.
[VOL. 62:173
2003] THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF SOLIDARITY
In her seemingly casual comment about "Sammy being Sammy,"
Stewart displayed a consummate affective solidarity with her client.
Faced with the possibility of a twenty-year sentence and having
pleaded guilty to drug trafficking charges in the Ecstasy case, Mr.
Gravano presumably did not have a lot of people with whom he could
engage in such repartee. 4 While this shared moment was fleeting,
3 5
the capacity for bonding with disdained clients displayed by Stewart
remains a significant virtue in a democratic legal system. 6
B. Positional Solidarity
Affective solidarity is not sufficient for lawyers who see their call-
ing as addressing societal injustice. Lawyers committed to this project
express positional solidarity with clients.37 In this stance, the lawyer
adopts a public position that dovetails with the client's express or im-
plied message. Positional solidarity can focus the lawyer's efforts, pro-
vide helpful information to prospective clients, and create a favorable
climate for social change. However, lawyers practicing positional soli-
darity should also recognize that this posture can undermine affective
ties and sabotage client interests. Moreover, positional solidarity in
34. See id.
35. See Glaberson, suna note 32. Gravano subsequently decided to seek other counsel,
presumably because he was in fact concerned that the Government would contend it had a
reasonable basis for monitoring his future conversations with Stewart, or because he no
longer believed that Stewart was the ideal person to assist him in seeking sentencing con-
sideration from the court and the United States Attorney. See id. Whatever Stewart's view
of the justice of the Government's motion to disqualify her, her understanding of her
client's situation doubtlessly led her to recognize the prudence in Gravano's calculus. See
infra note 76 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Stewart case in depth); see also George Packer, Left
Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 6, at 42 (quoting Stewart as describing the imprisoned
Sheikh Abdel Rahman as "Daniel in the lion's den"). However, exalting affective commit-
ment also creates risks. An excess of solidarity can rob a lawyer of the clear eye necessary
for evaluating a client's case. See Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interfer-
ence in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 259, 270-74 (1999) (analyzing phe-
nomenon that psychologists call counter-transference, in which a client's traumas are
transferred to the lawyer).
37. Cf Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of
Interest and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2339, 2340 (1999)
(drawing a distinction between positional conflicts of interest, which involve the simultane-
ous argument of two opposing legal propositions in the same tribunal, and mission con-
flicts, which involve disputes about the objectives of a public interest law organization). In
that piece, I argued that public interest organizations should construe mission conflicts
narrowly to allow maximum space for representing diverse community interests. Id. at
2363. My use of the term "positional solidarity" here is closer to the concept of mission
outlined in my earlier piece.
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terrorism cases can evolve into an operational link that exceeds the
lawyer's role.38
Lawyers identify themselves with their clients' positions in a vari-
ety of contexts. Legal services lawyers often see themselves as repre-
senting the interests of people living in poverty.3 9 Lawyers for
survivors of domestic violence fight for equality in society's treatment
of relationships within the family.4" Civil rights lawyers fought notjust
to benefit individual clients, but also to end segregation.4 ' For lawyers
representing persons or groups accused of terrorist activity,4 2 posi-
38. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (noting how representation of suspected
terrorists may veer into operational solidarity).
39. Margulies, supra note 37, at 2339-40.
40. Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Pov-
erty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1103-04
(1995).
41. Cf Bell, supra note 16, at 490-91 (discussing the conflict between the goals of civil
rights attorneys and their clients). Human rights lawyers cultivate a similar solidarity, often
informed by allegiance to the systemic ideal of the "rule of law." See Ronen Shamir & Neta
Ziv, State-Oriented and Community-Oriented Lawyering for a Cause: A Tale of Two Strategies, in
CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 287, 297 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Sche-
ingold eds., 2001) (stating that most cause lawyers believe litigation and constitutional ar-
guments are the most successful strategy); cf George Bisharat, Attorneys for the People,
Attorneys for the Land: The Emergence of Cause Lawyering in the Israeli-Occupied Territories, in
CAUSE LAWYERING" POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 453, 471-72
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (discussing how a narrow focus on rule of
law issues can discourage broader use of law for social change).
42. This Article defines terrorism as the intentional targeting of civilians for political
purposes by nominally non-governmental groups. Such organizations may benefit from
state sponsorship or, as in the case of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, exercise clandestine con-
trol over the state apparatus. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMON-
SENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 6 (1998) (defining terrorism as "violence
conducted as part of a political strategy by a subnational group or secret agents of a foreign
state"); Richard Falk, Ends and Means: Defining a Just War, THE NATION, Oct. 29, 2001, at 11-
12 (arguing that Al Qaeda is a "transnational actor... [whose] relationship to the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan [was] .. .contingent, with Al Qaeda being more the sponsor of the
state rather than the other way around"). Contemporary terrorist organizations, ranging
from Al Qaeda to the Kach group in Israel, single out persons of particular groups for
violence. Al Qaeda has targeted Americans and Jews, while the Kach group, on a scale
smaller in implementation but not necessarily in ambition, has targeted Palestinians. See
BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 101 (1998) (discussing the genocidal rhetoric of
Kach). States have legitimate interests in deterring such violence.
Adopting this definition of terrorist activity gives rise to two important caveats. First,
deterring group violence must be accompanied by strong efforts to eliminate the use of
inappropriate violence and the pursuit of inequitable policies by states, including
America's allies. See DANA R. VILLA, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, TERROR: ESSAYS ON THE
THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 15-21 (1999) (discussing "totalitarian terror"); Gerald L.
Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 323 (2000) (discussing "state terrorism" as one strand in the definition of
terrorism). Second, the legal system must guard against the prospect that fear of terror-
ism, like fear of incursions from other states, will prompt measures that threaten civil liber-
ties and single out individuals for unfair treatment. SeeJAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE,
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tional solidarity can involve support of goals and tactics. Lynne Stew-
art, for example, explained her representation of the Islamic Group's
Sheikh Abdel Rahman, a foe of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, by ac-
knowledging, "I certainly have deep sympathy for the struggle in
Egypt... [the fundamentalist movement] is the only hope for change
there, the one that gathers the imagination of the people, that moti-
vates them. '4 3 Speaking of tactics, Stewart explained, "I don't believe
in anarchistic violence but in directed violence .... That would be
violence directed at the institutions which perpetuate capitalism, ra-
cism and sexism, and at the people who are the appointed guardians
of those institutions, and accompanied by public support."44
Applying her typology of "anarchistic" versus "directed" violence,
Stewart described the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 as
"pretty much anarchistic."45 She never publicly endorsed specific ac-
tions for which the Islamic Group claimed responsibility, such as the
1997 attack on a group of tourists in Luxor, Egypt which killed over
sixty people.46 However, Stewart used her access to the media to pub-
licize her client Sheikh Abdel Rahman's views favoring violence. In
2000, for example, Stewart announced to the media the decision by
the Sheikh, still serving his federal sentence for plotting to blow up
New York City landmarks, to withdraw his support for a cease-fire de-
clared by the Islamic Group after the Luxor attack.4 7
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CML LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL
SECURITY 35-48 (2002) (detailing pre-September 11 law enforcement targeting of Palestin-
ian students for espousing unpopular views); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Rec-
ognizing Client Narrative in Case Theoy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 561 (1994) (discussing racist
stereotypes of Arabs after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing); Natsu Taylor Saito,
Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Ter-
rorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11-15 (2001) (discussing images of Arabs and Muslims in American
media as terrorists and profiling by law enforcement groups); cf Susan M. Akram & Kevin
R. Johnson, 'Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy '--
Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and
Muslims, 58 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002) (discussing post-September 11 detentions of
Muslims and Arabs); Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575 (2002)
(same).
43. Joseph P. Fried, In Muslim Cleric's Trial, a Radical Defender; Left-Leaning Lawyer and
Revolutionay Sympathizer Comes Back in the Limelight, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at BI. Stew-
art argued that the Government was framing the Sheikh, who at the time was charged with
plotting to blow up New York City landmarks, because of his political and religious opin-
ions. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Douglas Jehl, 70 Die in Attack at Egypt Temple, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al
(describing the attack of tourists in Luxor, Egypt).
47. Cam Simpson, Terrorists Push Plots from Jail; Militant Sheik Got Messages to His Follow-
ers, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2001, at IN.
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The high profile that Stewart maintained as she opined publicly
about violence illustrates crucial problems positional solidarity can
pose for both clients and the public interest. Over time, this stance
enhances the lawyer's status, but can narrow options for clients . 4  Sit-
uations involving positional solidarity on the use of violence demon-
strate, moreover, that unleashed violence has an inflexible dynamic of
its own.4 9 This dynamic makes short work of distinctions such as
Lynne Stewart's categories of "anarchistic" and "directed" violence.5 °
Positional solidarity's risks for clients emerge at every turn in the
legal process: counseling, pretrial, and trial. A lawyer may fail to ade-
quately counsel her clients because her view of what the law should be
leads her to disregard what the law is. For example, the lawyer may
doubt the constitutionality of legislation that prohibits material sup-
port of organizations, like the Islamic Group, designated by the Secre-
tary of State as engaging in terrorist activity.5 However, if the lawyer
fails to advise her client that courts have rejected facial challenges to
this legislation,52 she may subject her client to harms that the client
has not foreseen.
Indications of harm to the client are implicit in the Stewart in-
dictment. For example, after the FBI arrested Stewart and her co-
defendants on charges of perpetuating fraud on the federal
government, making false statements, and providing material support
to a designated terrorist organization, the Bureau of Prisons moved
Sheikh Abdel Rahman from his location in Minnesota, and barred
him from communicating with his remaining attorneys until they
48. Lawyers' decisions may narrow a client's options in a variety of ways. See Bell, supra
note 16, at 471, 490 (arguing that lawyers opposing segregation sometimes discounted cli-
ents' interests in other approaches, such as maximizing resources for schools in African-
American communities); Margulies, supra note 40, at 1071 (criticizing poverty lawyers for
initially failing to pay sufficient attention to violence against women); cf Clayton P. Gillette,
Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998) (discussing "path dependence"
in evolution of legal doctrine, in which prior agendas limit future development).
49. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients
Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 99 (1994).
50. See supra text accompanying note 45 (noting Stewart's distinction of "anarchistic"
and "directed" violence).
51. See, e.g., David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right
of Association, 1999 Sup. CT. REv. 203, 205-06 (arguing that the 1996 Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, violates First Amendment rights
because it makes it unlawful to support terrorist organizations in their lawful activities).
52. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that
civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for funding a foreign terrorist organization does not
violate the freedom to associate if the defendant had knowledge of the group's illegal
activity and helped to support that activity); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d
1130, 1133-36 (9th Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
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signed an agreement to permit monitoring of their conversations with
the Sheikh.5 ' This condition is not unreasonable if the Government
can support its allegations regarding the course of conduct between
the Sheikh and Stewart.54 If the allegations are true, Stewart could
have avoided the imposition of these new restraints on her client by
fulfilling the lawyer's traditional role of cautioning a client who has
approached the border of illegal activity.
The lawyer's positional solidarity may also narrow the client's op-
tions pretrial. Positional solidarity may, for example, lead the lawyer to
rule out cooperation with the "enemy," i.e., the government.55 The
lawyer may seek the client's martyrdom, rather than a favorable deal.
The client may not share this view.
56
The diminishing returns of positional solidarity continue at trial.
A lawyer who publicly avows solidarity with violence gains the atten-
tion of both prospective consumers of her services and the public at
large. The lawyer's public expressions of support for violence provide
a benefit for prospective clients, by helping them make more in-
formed decisions about retaining counsel.57 Once prospective clients
53. Robert F. Worth, Government Cuts Contact with Sheikh, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 2002, at B4.
54. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate standard
for monitoring attorney-client conversations).
55. Lawyers who specialize in the representation of criminal defendants sometimes
criticize cooperation with the government, otherwise known as "snitching," as a form of
betrayal, an invitation to dishonesty, and a practice that compromises the checks on gov-
ernment power built into the adversary system. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 118-19 (1995); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L.
REv. 563, 618-19 (1999).
56. See Richman, supra note 55, at 126 (noting that some clients want to cooperate with
the government). Of course, the client may wish to be a martyr after all. This may be one
of the objectives driving the desire of Zacarias Moussaoui, who is charged by the govern-
ment with being the "twentieth hijacker" slated for the September 11 attacks, to represent
himself. A lawyer must retain the flexibility to engage her client in a conversation about
objectives, without restricting alternatives through preconceptions about either the client
or the legal landscape. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sun-
day Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuF. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1990) (discussing ways in
which speech patterns inform preconceptions about clients).
Positional solidarity with violence not only imputes the desire for martyrdom to the
client, but acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The government will be less willing to offer a
worthwhile plea agreement if it does not trust the defendant's attorney. See Daniel C. Rich-
man, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 757, 765-67 (1999) [hereinafter Federal Criminal Law] (discussing how federal criminal
law gives a large degree of discretionary authority to prosecutors). See generally Gerard E.
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117 (1998) (dis-
cussing prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining).
57. For a prospective client such as Sheikh Abdel Rahman who faced virtually universal
opprobrium, a lawyer's prior public statements are a signal that the lawyer will treat the
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become clients, however, relying on the lawyer's positional solidarity
can be treacherous.
While prospective clients seek out lawyers who express positional
solidarity with violence, the public at large does not share these senti-
ments. An attorney may not object to such notoriety; indeed, she may
court it. Unfortunately, when the attorney arrives at court with her
client, she may confront members of this hostile public in the jury
pool. Since jurors inevitably judge a defendant in part based on their
view of the defendant's lawyer, at this juncture the client derives little
benefit from the lawyer's positional solidarity.58 Indeed, public knowl-
edge of the lawyer's support of violence may make it more difficult for
the defendant to credibly assert that he did not commit the acts
charged.59 In such cases, the lawyer's signaling may work too well,
with the client receiving messages of solidarity, but the jury perceiving
signals of guilt.6"
client with empathy. In this sense, positional solidarity actually reinforces affective
solidarity.
58. The lawyer may seek to ferret out such predispositions on voir dire. See Tigar, supra
note 25, at 191 (noting the oath jurors take at voir dire to answer all questions truthfully).
Formulating effective questions may, however, be difficult; the lawyer may wish to avoid
queries such as: "Have you ever heard of me?", "How do you really feel about attorneys who
advocate violence?" or "Did I have a bad hair day on 'The O'Reilly Factor?"' In addition,
in federal court, where most terrorism cases are tried,judges control voir dire. Ajudge has
little incentive to inquire about these issues.
Positional solidarity affects the client's prospects at trial not only through juror predis-
positions, but also through lack of access to information possessed by the government.
Outside of the realm of exculpatory evidence, which the government must turn over to the
defense, prosecutors have wide discretion about what evidence to disclose. See generally
Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability ?,
83 VA. L. REv. 939, 941 (1997) (discussing how the rules of evidence affect prosecutorial
discretion). Prosecutors will be much less willing to disclose information to attorneys
whom they regard as encouraging violence. I am grateful to Dan Richman for sharing this
observation.
59. The noted radical lawyer William Kunstler understood this phenomenon. See WIL-
LIAM M. KUNSTLER & SHEILA ISENBERG, My LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER, at xv (1994) (noting
how Kunstler declined to defend a man accused of shooting and killing Yeshiva students
because he did not regard the matter as political, and "felt that the case could seriously
harm [his] representation of defendants" in the pending trial of Sheikh Abdel Rahman
and others). Here, again, the skilled lawyer will generally seek to cultivate some ambiguity
in her public statements, to avoid this problem. Perhaps Stewart was hoping to produce
this kind of ambiguity with her distinction between "institutional" and "anarchistic"
violence.
60. See, e.g., Tigar, supra note 25, at 197 (arguing that a client will bear the brunt of a
jury who dislikes a lawyer). Clients may also seek to send messages to the jury through
their choice of counsel. Cf Wilkins, supra note 10, at 1038 (arguing that African-American
lawyers should not serve as counsel for persons or groups with avowedly racist views who
may select a lawyer to "launder" offensive positions).
[VOL. 62:173
THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF SOLIDARITY
Lawyers expressing support for violence should also recognize
that violence is a seductive topic of conversation, but a difficult habit
to control. A lawyer may start with the generic advocacy initially en-
gaged in by Lynne Stewart, gingerly distinguishing between "directed"
and "anarchistic" violence.6" Over time, however, the lawyer's pro-
nouncements about violence may become more specific as to timing,
targets, or intended audience. For example, the Government alleges
that Stewart ended up facilitating the communication of more specific
statements about violence, intended for action by members of the Is-
lamic Group, including a directive to "kill Jews] wherever they are."62
Such specificity risks transforming the lawyer into a collaborator in
criminal activity.
C. Operational Solidarity
That collaboration is the subject of the third and final kind of
allegiance: operational solidarity. Operational solidarity entails the
lawyer's participation in ongoing enterprises conducted by the client.
This brand of solidarity undermines the Tocquevillian conception of
the lawyer as an intermediary between client and state.63 To cultivate
the perspective necessary for this intermediary function, the lawyer
requires some degree of independence. Operational solidarity com-
promises that perspective, placing both client and public interests at
risk.64
To preserve the Tocquevillian role, the law generally frowns on
lawyers becoming operationally involved with clients. Lawyers going
into business with clients, even in the seemingly innocuous context of
receiving options to buy stock in a corporation as payment for legal
work, must observe special procedural safeguards to limit overreach-
ing. 65 The law is even more watchful of a lawyer's active or tacit in-
volvement in client crime or fraud. Lawyers cannot counsel a client to
61. Fried, supra note 43 (providing Stewart's statements).
62. See Indictment at 14-15.
63. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 13, at 266 (explaining that the lawyer is the liaison
between the government and the people).
64. A parallel critique of operational solidarity would argue that it blurs the line be-
tween principal and agent that defines a lawyer's task. For a discussion that interprets the
lawyer's function and purpose toward the client as an agency relationship, see James A.
Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer of the Court", 48 BuF. L. REv.
349, 399-401 (2000).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.8(a) (1983). Indeed, a written agreement is
necessary to allow the lawyer to share in a contingent fee arrangement, such as for a dam-
age claim, that is the subject of a legal action in which the lawyer represents the client. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.5(c).
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engage in ongoing illegal activity.66 The crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege allows courts to compel disclosure of commu-
nications that give rise to such counsel.67 Lawyers may not aid clients
who wish to testify falsely, even though rules preventing such aid may
chill lawyer-client communications, thereby compromising affective
solidarity.68
Properly applied, rules that bar a lawyer's operational ties to
ongoing crimes serve both client and public interests. A lawyer with
an operational tie to the client cannot adequately advise the client
about the loss of protections, such as attorney-client privilege, on
which the client may rely.69 Rules against operational solidarity also
protect the public by preventing the lawyer from trading on profes-
sional prerogatives to discharge the less revered role of accomplice in
wrongdoing.70
Consider, for example, a case in which evidence suggests that a
lawyer has assisted his client in fleeing the jurisdiction.71 In such a
case, the lawyer has not acted as an attorney, using her skill and judg-
ment to counter the government's charges. Instead, the lawyer has
exploited her role as a professional to enhance her value as an acces-
sory after the fact.72 Rules regulating operational solidarity seek to
deter such manipulation. Such concerns become particularly acute in
the context of representing persons accused of terrorist activity. In
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
67. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Florida, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege permits disclosure
of confidential company documents created under lawyers' rubric specifically for the pur-
pose of allowing the company to conceal from the public the health risks of smoking and
the company's knowledge thereof); see also In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan
Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992) (stating "an attorney may not continue
to provide services to... clients when the attorney knows the client is engaged in a course
of conduct designed to deceive others, and where it is obvious that the attorney's compli-
ant legal services may be a substantial factor in permitting the deceit to continue").
68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (prohibiting an attorney from offering
evidence that the attorney knows is false).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (2002) (stating that "[t]he lawyer's
own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a
client").
70. SeeJANET MALCOLM, THE CRIME OF SHELIA McGOUGH 9-10 (1999) (describing a case
in which a lawyer was convicted of fraud because of her participation in her client's confi-
dence scheme). The lawyer denied culpability and asserted that she had declined to testify
on her own behalf out of loyalty to her client.
71. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 1994) (mentioning that the Govern-
ment suspected that the defendant's attorney had helped the defendant to flee the
country).
72. The Government alleges that Lynne Stewart gamed the system in an analogous
fashion. See Indictment at 12-16.
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such cases, clients may use lawyers to launder money for illegal opera-
tions through a legal defense fund. 73 Clients may also leverage law-
yers to both disseminate plans for future violence and conceal such
plans from law enforcement. 74 Use of lawyers as accessories to terror
impinges on the safety of the public and the integrity of the legal
profession.
Application of rules against operational solidarity must, however,
assure the lawyer's independence not only from her client, but also
from the state. Overbroad interpretation of safeguards against opera-
tional solidarity would encompass core lawyering functions in a de-
mocracy, such as defense of a client against charges of past
criminality. 75 Courts interpreting rules against operational solidarity
cannot allow the government to use such rules against attorneys
whose principal offense is effective representation of unpopular
clients.
II. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES: ENSURING INDEPENDENCE OR IMPOSING
SOLIDARITY WITH THE STATE?
The best prosecutors understand that a vigorous advocate for the
defense strengthens the democratic ideals underlying the criminaljus-
tice system. However, prosecutors may also seek strategic advantage
by undermining solidarity between a defendant and his lawyer. 76 In
times of national crisis, moreover, undermining the solidarity of a law-
yer with an unpopular client is a convenient means of stifling dis-
sent.77 Courts should consider these risks when they confront the
73. See United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that
the Government, in the trial of Abdel Rahman and his co-defendants, had proffered evi-
dence that the legal defense fund of one co-defendant, raised in connection with a prior
state prosecution, was disbursed by another co-defendant for illegal activity).
74. This is the gravamen of the allegations against Stewart. Indictment at 11-16.
75. A lawyer who successfully defends a client against such charges does, in some literal
fashion, "facilitate" ongoing illegality if a client subsequently engages in criminal acts. See
Ogletree, supra note 1, at 1270 (noting that many acquitted defendants find themselves in
trouble with the law at a later time).
76. See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper. The Prosecutor's Responsibility When Defense
Counsel Has a Potential Conflict ofInterest, 16 AM.J. CRIM. L. 323, 354-56 (1989) [hereinafter
Her Brother's Keeper] (noting that prosecutors have an opportunity to call a defense lawyer's
former client as a witness or initiate a criminal investigation against the defense attorney to
create an ethical conflict between the attorney and his client); Bruce A. Green, "Through a
Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1201, 1230 (1989) (discussing the impact of disqualification motions on an attorney-client
relationship).
77. See generally Hentoff, supra note 5 (repeating that the result of Stewart's indictment
will "create a huge chilling effect-indeed, a glacial effect-on attorneys approached by
highly controversial clients to represent them").
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repertoire of methods the government uses to curb solidarity. This
repertoire includes motions for disqualification, the imposition of
conditions on lawyer-client communication, and criminal prosecution
of lawyers.78 This section discusses these options, and then describes
the Government's case against Lynne Stewart.
A. Government Efforts to Regulate Operational Solidarity
1. Conditions on Lawyer-Client Communication.-The government
has for some time imposed post-trial communications restrictions on
some prisoners convicted of terrorist activity and on the lawyers who
represent them. 79 These restrictions, typically called "Special Adminis-
trative Measures" (SAMs), limit the inmate's contact with persons who
could send or receive information related to terrorist activities.80
They also limit the attorney's ability to communicate with third parties
or with the media on her client's behalf.81
In a more radical move, after September 11, the Department of
Justice announced that it would begin monitoring the conversations
of some thirteen defendants in federal custody.82 In most cases, the
government did not indicate whether it had probable cause that
would justify such a restriction.83 The government noted that it would
notify attorneys and clients subject to such monitoring and screen ac-
78. See Bureau of Prisons, General Management and Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3
(2002) (authorizing the monitoring of attorney-client communications); Green, Her
Brother's Keeper, supra note 76, at 354-56 (discussing the prosecutor's duty to disqualify op-
posing counsel based on conflict of interest); Weiser & Worth, supra note 22 (detailing the
indictment of Lynne Stewart).
79. The government conditions the lawyer's access to their clients on consent to the
restrictions. See Indictment at 4-5.
80. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3. In their focus on avoiding aid to terrorist activity, SAMs have a
different rationale than the more traditional limit on attorneys' communication: the gag
order. A judge imposes a gag order during the pendency and conduct of a trial to bar
both the prosecution and defense from discussing the merits of the case in a manner likely
to influence potential jurors. See United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 829-31, 841 (2d Cir.
1995) (upholding a contempt citation against an attorney for repeatedly violating a gag
order).
81. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3; see also Indictment at 4-5.
82. See Steve Fainaru, Saudi Convicted in Embassy Bombings Sues; Filing Challenges Rule
Allowing Eavesdropping on Attorney-Client Discussions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002, at A20 (not-
ing that Attorney GeneralJohn Ashcroft approved a new attorney-client monitoring rule in
October 2001 on an emergency basis).
83. See Hentoff, supra note 5 (quoting Professor Stephen Gillers as arguing that moni-
toring should require court order and showing of probable cause). The government indi-
cated after the Lynne Stewart indictment that it would require consent to such monitoring
by any attorney seeking to meet with Sheikh Abdel Rahman. Worth, supra note 53. The
allegations in the Stewart indictment, if supported, constitute the kind of individualized
evidence of misconduct that would justify such an extreme measure. See supra notes 5-6
and accompanying text.
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cess to the recordings to reduce the risk of disclosing attorney-client
privileged material to a lawyer appearing for the government in court
on any related matter.84 Critics asserted that monitoring would im-
pede not just the operational allegiance in illegal conduct, but any
kind of meaningful rapport between attorney and client.8"
2. Disqualification.-The government has long sought to curb
operational solidarity by moving to disqualify attorneys in criminal
cases on two linked rationales: (1) the attorney's loyalty to, or posses-
sion of, confidential information about another client constitutes a
conflict of interest, and (2) the attorney's participation in communi-
cations involving alleged ongoing illegality among defendants trans-
forms the attorney's role at trial from the appropriate role of advocate
to the inappropriate role of "unsworn witness. '"86
Conflicts of interest are common in cases involving alleged con-
certed criminal enterprises, including organized crime and terrorist
activity. "Kingpins" of such enterprises commonly pay attorneys to
provide legal services for underlings.87 In terrorist cases, defendants
tend to cluster around attorneys like Lynne Stewart or her one-time
co-counsel, the late radical lawyer William Kunstler, whose public pro-
nouncements signal both affective and positional solidarity.8 8 Con-
flicts of interest arise when members of the enterprise decide to
cooperate with the government, and a lawyer who had previously rep-
84. In cases where the government can show probable cause to believe that lawyer and
client are collaborating in an illegal activity, the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client
privilege would permit admission of any evidence demonstrating such a collaboration.
Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Laryers, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 327, 344 (1998)
(citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 661 (10th Cir. 1998)). To ease its bur-
den in such cases, the government received statutory permission from Congress to obtain
warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). See Hurtado, supra note
5. It was apparently this Act that, more than a year before September 11, provided the
authority for a warrant permitting the government to record the conversations of Lynne
Stewart and members of her legal team with Sheikh Rahman. See id.
85. Hurtado, supra note 5. At least one lawsuit has been filed on the monitoring issue.
See Fainaru, supra note 82.
86. See Green, Her Brother's Keeper, supra note 76, at 328-29.
87. See Richman, supra note 55, at 122.
88. Kunsder's law firm, Kunstler & Kuby, at one point represented virtually all of the
individuals who became defendants in United States v. Rahman. 861 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). The court disqualified the firm from representing co-defendant El-Gabrowny in
that matter because, inter alia, the firm acting as El-Gabrowny's agent had made a number
of conflicting representations to the court about the purpose of fraudulent passports
found in El-Gabrowny's control. Id at 272-73. The court reasoned that if El-Gabrowny
took the stand in his own defense, these statements might have been admissible for im-
peachment purposes. Id. at 273. Counsel, if permitted to proceed, may have exhibited
greater reluctance to call El-Gabrowny because they faced embarrassment at the revelation
of their contradictory accounts.
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resented that individual now must cross-examine her in the course of
representing others in the organization."9
In cases involving such a cluster of relationships, courts may also
resort to the unsworn witness theory. The rationale for the unsworn
witness theory is that a lawyer who was present for many of the occur-
rences, conversations, or transactions that comprise the government's
proof can "subtly impart" her take on those events to the jury, without
the usual safeguards such as testimony under oath and cross-examina-
tion."0 The attorney then comes to occupy a kind of dual role, becom-
ing in effect an "unsworn witness."9'
Courts have held that a lawyer's performance of the unsworn wit-
ness role prejudices the prosecution. For example, in the prosecution
of John Gotti, significant portions of the Government's proof involved
wide-ranging conversations with Gotti's associates, which Gotti's attor-
ney, Bruce Cutler, observed.92 Cutler could have turned his own per-
formance before the jury into an unsworn counterpoint to the
Government's testimony. The court granted the Government's mo-
tion to disqualify Cutler to preclude this kind of end-run around evi-
dentiary safeguards.93 The unsworn witness doctrine's message about
operational solidarity is clear: to avoid disqualification, lawyers should
avoid being "in the room" when a client and his associates engage in
casual conversation about criminal activity.
3. Criminal Prosecution.-The government resorts to criminal
prosecution when it views disqualification as an inadequate response
89. To cross-examine effectively, the lawyer may be required to use knowledge she ac-
quired when representing the witness-knowledge acquired in reliance on the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality. In some cases, courts have turned to standby counsel-an attorney
not affiliated with the lawyer for the current defendant-to perform the cross-examina-
tion. See id. at 277. However, the closer the relationship between the representation of the
witness and the charges against the defendant, the more difficult it is to cure a conflict
through standby counsel or to allow a waiver by the defendant. Id. This is particularly true
because the defendant's lawyer may use confidential information, not just in cross-exami-
nation of the former client, but in direct or cross-examination of other witnesses, and in
opening and closing.
90. See Roxanne Malaspina, Resolving the Conflict of the Unsworn Witness: A Framework for
Disqualifying House Counsel Under the Advocate-Witness Rule, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1073, 1094-98
(1992) (discussing the unsworn witness theory); see also Rahman, 861 F. Supp. at 275-76.
91. Malaspina, supra note 90, at 1096.
92. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 934 (2d Cir. 1993). Because these conver-
sations involved planning ongoing criminal activity rather than mere discussion of the le-
gal implications of past acts, the tapes did not contain matter protected by attorney-client
privilege and were thus admissible at trial. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-631
(1989) (noting that the crime-fraud exception begins to apply when an attorney's advice or
services are used to conduct or continue criminal acts).
93. Locascio, 6 F.3d at 934.
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to operational solidarity. The history of criminal prosecution of attor-
neys for acts of operational solidarity reflects the competing concerns
outlined in this Article. On the one hand, prosecution focuses on
lawyers who trade in their professional prerogatives to facilitate illegal
conduct.94 However, times of crisis have also precipitated punitive ac-
tion against lawyers who represented clients perceived as threats to
public order or the prevailing national consensus.05
The last century witnessed repeated governmental efforts,
founded or unfounded, to prosecute or impose professional disci-
pline on lawyers representing social, political, and economic outsid-
ers. For example, the Government twice indicted Clarence Darrow
for allegedly bribing jurors during the McNamara trial.96 Ajury took
ten minutes to acquit Darrow in the first case, while anotherjury dead-
locked in the second case, in which charges ultimately were dis-
missed.97 After the United States entered World War I, states
disbarred lawyers who associated with radical labor organizations such
as the International Workers of the World, and jailed lawyers who
counseled clients not to register for the draft.9" Decades later, the FBI
tapped the phone of Martin Luther King's friend and adviser, lawyer
Stanley Levison, who was also subpoenaed to appear before the Sen-
ate Internal Security Subcommittee.99 Federal authorities apparently
suspected Levison of being a Communist.100
More recently, the government has prosecuted attorneys as part
of the war on drugs. In the mid-1990s, a number of Miami lawyers
were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, money laundering and racke-
teering, based, in part, on evidence that they acted as "bag men" for
the Colombian Cali drug cartel.101 In 1999, Lynne Stewart pleaded
94. See Green, supra note 84, at 355-60 (describing varying degrees of conduct that may
lead a lawyer to be considered an accessory to her client's ongoing criminal enterprises).
95. Id. at 327 (arguing that recent prosecutions risk "overcriminalization" of zealous
advocacy for clients).
96. DARROW, supranote 23, at 185-90.
97. Id. at 189-91. Subsequent research suggests that Darrow may actually have been
guilty. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Introduction to DARROW, supra, at v-vi.
98. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 104 (1976).
99. See KUNSTLER & ISENBERG, supra note 59, at 110-11.
100. Id.
101. See Larry Lebowitz, Curious Jurors Ask: Where Is Moran ?; Panelists Noticed Cartel Attorney
Missing at Trial, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, July 25, 1998, at 1B (discussing the convic-
tions of lawyers Michael Abell and William Moran for racketeering and money laundering
conspiracy). One attorney who pleaded guilty admitted that he had knowingly obtained
false statements on behalf of drug defendants, and had delivered $75,000 in drug profits to
the wife of a jailed drug trafficker. Associated Press, Ex-Federal Prosecutor Pleads Guilty in
Columbia Cocaine Case, CHI. TRm., July 3, 1995, at 1C.
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guilty to the misdemeanor charge of refusing to testify before a grand
jury about a fee agreement with a client convicted of drug
trafficking. 1
0 2
In some of these cases, lawyers may have veered into operational
solidarity, committing crimes or counseling others to do so. In other
cases, however, the government targeted attorneys for their positional
solidarity with unpopular groups or movements for social change. 10
3
The high stakes involved in representation of persons accused of ter-
rorist activity magnify the importance of the boundary between opera-
tional and positional ties.
B. Prosecution or Persecution: The Lynne Stewart Case
The Government's case against Lynne Stewart hinges on the loca-
tion of the border between operational and positional solidarity. The
Government asserts that her conduct falls squarely on the operational
side of the divide.10 4 Stewart and her supporters argue that the Gov-
ernment is seeking to silence a resourceful courtroom adversary and
shrink the protections of the First and Sixth Amendments for groups
that challenge the status quo.10 5 Some brief background on the Stew-
art indictment and its underlying context may inform the analysis of
these competing views.
Lynne Stewart defended Sheikh Abdel Rahman against charges
that he and others conspired to assist in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and bomb New York City landmarks such as the Holland
Tunnel and the United Nations building.1 ° 6 A jury convicted the
102. See Andrew Jacobs, Defense Layer Pleads Guilty to Refusing to Testify About a Client,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at B4. Stewart's lawyer, Stanley Cohen, explained Stewart's deci-
sion not to testify in terms of positional solidarity, asserting, "She refused to become a
snitch against her client for the government, and that is something she is proud of." Id.
103. The breadth of federal criminal law gives prosecutors substantial discretion subject
to minimal accountability. See generally Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 56 (dis-
cussing prosecutorial power provided by a substantive sweep of federal criminal law). For a
discussion on lack of accountability of federal prosecutors, and risk of enforcement based
on invidious stereotypes, see Richman, supra note 58.
104. See Indictment at 9-10, 12-13 (accusing Stewart of conspiring with Sheikh Abdel
Rahman and others to provide material support to IG).
105. See United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 95 (D. Mass. 2002) (commenting that
the Stewart indictment will have a chilling effect); J. Sofflyah Elijah, The Reality of Political
Prisoners in the United States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them, 18 HARV.
BLAcKLErrER L.J. 129, 136 (2002) (discussing the possibility of a chilling effect on defense
attorneys); Hentoff, supra note 5 (quoting Professor Jonathan Turley who stated that the
indictment could "create a huge, chilling effect ... on attorneys approached by highly
controversial clients to represent them").
106. Ajury also convicted Sheikh Abdel Rahman of soliciting an attack on United States
military installations and the murder of Egyptian President Mubarak. United States v.
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Sheikh and his co-defendants of these charges." 7 The court sen-
tenced the Sheikh to a term of life imprisonment plus sixty-five
years. 0 8
After Sheikh Abdel Rahman's conviction, the Secretary of State
designated his organization, the Islamic Group, as a terrorist organiza-
tion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). ' The United States Bureau of Prisons became concerned
that the Sheikh, during his incarceration, would continue to commu-
nicate with members of the Islamic Group still at large for the purpose
of conspiring to commit additional violent crimes. 1 0 To guard
against this risk, the Bureau of Prisons invoked its authority under
federal regulations to impose SAMs on the Sheikh.' These measures
prohibited the Sheikh "from having contact with other inmates and
others ... that could reasonably forseeably result in the inmate com-
municating information (sending or receiving) that could circumvent
the SAM's intent of significantly limiting the inmate's ability to com-
municate (send or receive) terrorist information." '1 2 As of April
1999, the conditions also barred the Sheikh from communicating with
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Sheikh Abdel Rahman was both
graphic and insistent in his urgings regarding Mubarak's assassination, which was to take
place during a visit of the Egyptian President to New York. Id. at 108. The Sheikh advised
one of his co-defendants to "make up with God... by turning his rifle's barrel to President
Mubarak's chest, and killing him." Id. at 117. He gave similar counsel to another co-defen-
dant, suggesting that he "[d]epend on God. Carry out this operation. It does not require
a fatwa. .... You are ready in training, but do it. Go ahead." Id.
107. Id. at 103. These convictions were upheld on appeal. Id.
108. Id. at 148 n.26.
109. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650 (Oct.
8, 1997).
110. In November 1997, after the Sheikh's conviction, the Islamic Group claimed re-
sponsibility for the attack in Luxor, Egypt that resulted in the shooting or stabbing deaths
of sixty-two people. It stated that the attack was designed to bring about the Sheikh's
release. Indictment at 5-6. In addition, the Government has asserted that it has evidence
demonstrating that the Sheikh's son, Mohammed Abdel Rahman, named as a co-conspira-
tor but not indicted in the Stewart case, Indictment at 15, sought to secure the Sheikh's
release by proposing a plane hijacking to Osama bin Laden, see Judith Miller, Traces of
Terrorism: The Sheik; Sheik's Son and bin Laden Spoke of Plots, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2002, at All. Moreover, according to the Government, Stewart's translator and co-defen-
dant Mohammed Yousry told the Sheikh during an attorney interview in 2000 that the
attack on the U.S.S. Cole was also designed to put pressure on the United States to free the
Sheikh. Benjamin Weiser, FB.L Affidavit Outlines Intent of Attack on Destroyer Cole, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2002, at A20. The evidence at Sheikh Abdel Rahman's trial included a tape
of him urging a co-defendant to "find a plan to destroy or to bomb or to... inflict damage
to the American Army." Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117.
111. Worth, supra note 53 (explaining some of the attorney-client communications con-
ditions placed on the Sheikh); see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing
communications conditions).
112. See Indictment at 4.
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the media directly or through any third person, including his attor-
ney.' 13 Stewart, who had continued to represent the Sheikh, signed
an affirmation (for an attorney, the equivalent of an affidavit under
oath) indicating that she agreed to abide by these conditions." 14
The indictment charges that Stewart provided "material support"
to a terrorist organization by willfully violating the SAMs that she had
agreed to observe and continued to conduct communications with
Sheikh Abdel Rahman regarding the violent activities of the Islamic
Group.' 1 5 For example, in May of 2000, the Sheikh dictated letters to
Stewart's translator in the lawyer's presence withdrawing support for a
previously agreed-upon cease-fire. 16 Stewart also issued a statement
to the media to that effect.' 17 In another instance, the Government
alleges that Stewart knowingly facilitated communication with Abdel
Rahman about a fatwah the Sheikh endorsed, directing members of
the Islamic Group "to kill [Jews] wherever they are."' 18
113. Id. at 4-5.
114. Id. at 5. Stewart does not dispute that she signed the affirmation. See id.
115. Id. at 7, 11-12.
116. Id. at 12. The Government alleges that Stewart pretended to be interviewing the
Sheikh by making random comments and taking copious notes, to conceal from prison
guards the Sheikh's dictation of the letter. Id. Government officials assert that their tapes
of Stewart's meetings with Sheikh Abdel Rahman indicate that Stewart bantered about her
routine with the Sheikh and her translator, Yousry, as they spoke in Arabic, prompting her
translator to tell the Sheikh, "She is saying, Your Eminence, that she can get an award for
her acting." See Weiser, supra note 110.
117. Indictment at 15; see also BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Lawyer Denies Islamic
Group Has Withdrawn Backing for Truce (June 24, 2000) (quoting Egyptian lawyer for Islamic
Group faction as disputing Lynne Stewart's report that Sheikh Abdel Rahman had with-
drawn his support for the cease-fire).
118. Indictment at 16. One can read the indictment to suggest that Ahmed Abdel Sat-
tar, a co-defendant of Stewart's whom the Government alleges helped coordinate the Is-
lamic Group's terrorist activities, was initially concerned that Stewart would deny that the
Sheikh had issued the fatwah on killingJews. See id. Stewart's translator allegedly told her
that Sattar, who had "ghost-written" the fatwah and placed it on a website operated by
another co-defendant, did not wish her to issue such a denial. Id. In a subsequent attorney
phone call, Sheikh Abdel Rahman allegedly told Yousry that he did not want a denial
issued, because, he said of the fatwah, "it is good." Id.
The indictment also argues that "material support" includes an alleged agreement
between Stewart and Sattar to falsely state that the Sheikh was being denied medical care.
According to the Government, both Stewart and Sattar acknowledged in their conversation
that the Sheikh was voluntarily refusing to take insulin as a treatment for his diabetes. Id.
at 18-19. This particular allegation seems both tangential to the Government's core case
and legally insufficient to make out a claim of material support. See infta notes 175-180 and
accompanying text (analyzing the legal basis for the indictment).
The indictment also contains charges based on Stewart's violations of the SAMs gov-
erning communication with Sheikh Abdel Rahman. It charges that Stewart, in signing the
affirmation regarding communication conditions but engaging in a pattern of violation of
those conditions, engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the United States. Indictment at 22-
23. Furthermore, the indictment charges that Stewart made false statements to the govern-
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III. SHIFTING ROLE BOUNDARIES: THE PROBLEM OF
TERRORIST AUTHORIZATION
The indictment in the Stewart matter reflects the shifting bound-
ary in terrorism cases between positional and operational solidarity.
Positional solidarity merges into operational allegiance when public
articulation of a client's position, such as the announcement that
Sheikh Abdel Rahman had withdrawn his support for the Islamic
Group's cease-fire, l t9 provides guidance for future acts of violence.
This merging of public pronouncements and tactical directives occurs
in the signaling behavior that we can call "terrorist authorization."
Signaling is a way of overcoming collective action problems. 2 0 It
entails the intentional or tacit sharing of understandings and expecta-
tions through cues and general pronouncements in situations that dis-
courage more explicit forms of communication. 12' Signaling
behavior is particularly useful in terrorist organizations characterized
by secrecy, rigorous religious beliefs, and ethnic or religious hatred.'2 2
In groups with strong religious commitments, the authorization
of proposed violence by clerics or other opinion leaders is a signal
that cancels adherence to nonviolent norms. 123 A general authoriza-
ment by affirming that she would abide by the communication conditions. Id. at 23-24.
Stewart has pleaded not guilty to all of the charges. See Hurtado, supra note 5.
119. See Hentoff, supra note 5.
120. See Gillette, supra note 48, at 835 (noting that some people have garnered enough
stature to effectively signal a new norm that they believe to be superior to the existing
norm); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27J. LEGAL
STUD. 765, 785-89 (1998) (using the signaling theory to discuss ways in which the state
encourages racial or ethnic discrimination when such practices are not the existing norm).
121. See Posner, supra note 120, at 767 (explaining that symbolic behavior can signify
adherence to, or rejection of, accepted norms).
122. See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cas-
cades, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 654-55 (1998) (discussing methods that ethnic activists use to
ethnify" and therefore solidify support for their norm).
123. See HEYMANN, supra note 42, at 99 (asserting that "[s]peeches or writings by charis-
matic leaders urging political violence can provide the battering ram of encouragement a
potential terrorist needs to take himself past the wall of social condemnation to a willing-
ness to commit violent acts"); HOFFMAN, supra note 42, at 94 (stating that "[r]eligion ...
imparted via clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine-therefore serves as a
legitimizing force. This explains why clerical sanction is so important to religious terrorists
and why religious figures are often required to 'bless' (i.e., approve or sanction) terrorist
operations before they are executed.").
Islam, for example, has a strong tradition of nonviolence that terrorists have sought to
erase with a revisionist account of sacred texts. SeeJOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TER-
ROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 20, 32 (2002) (noting Islamic strictures against killing noncom-
batants, yet relating how Osama bin Laden issued a fatwah "allowing the killing of innocent
people" even though he lacked the religious authority to do so); Kanan Makiya & Hassan
Mneimneh, Manual for a 'Raid', N.Y. REv., Jan. 17, 2002, at 18 (citing a recent statement by
mainstream Muslim clerics that, "Islam provides clear rules and ethical norms that forbid
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tion of violence by a cleric also disseminates instructions for terrorist
activity without attracting unwanted attention from law enforcement
authorities. To preserve secrecy, terrorist enterprises such as the Is-
lamic Group often have a decentralized command structure in which
leaders delegate operational planning to isolated cells.' 24 A public
statement such as, "The gates of resistance are open totally,"' is the
trigger operatives need to begin planning actions. 26 A broad authori-
zation suffices because such organizations are indiscriminate in their
targets, aiming not at particular individuals but at any and all persons
of a particular nationality or religion.' 2 7 Examples of such group
the killing of noncombatants, as well as women, children, and the elderly.. ." and contrast-
ing Al Qaeda's training manual which instructs followers to "kill Americans ... whenever
and wherever they find [them]").
Jewish terrorists, such as the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, sought the same revisionist re-
sult. See HOFFMAN, supra, at 101 (noting that Kahane "openly called upon the Israeli gov-
ernment to establish an official 'Jewish terrorist group' whose sole purpose would be to
'kill Arabs and drive them out of Israel and the Occupied Territories"').
124. See Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, in How DID
THIS HAPPEN? 1, 9 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001) (discussing the impor-
tance of compartmentalization in Al Qaeda operations, including the September 11 at-
tacks); cf SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA, MACHIAVELLI IN HELL 9 (1989) (discussing Machiavelli's
view that conspiracies fail when they disseminate information too widely among
participants).
125. A key political leader of Hamas recently acknowledged that he used this phrase to
trigger suicide bombings. Joel Brinkley, Arabs' Grief in Bethlehem, Bombers' Gloating in Gaza,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at Al. The leader noted that the military leaders hear this author-
ization, "and they listen because we are the political leaders." Id.
126. Id. Courts have expanded the ability of the legal system to reach public statements
that threaten harm. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that the First
Amendment does not protect graphic and negative public descriptions of particular indi-
viduals that are meant to intimidate, where the speaker could reasonably foresee that the
subject of the descriptions would interpret them as a "serious expression of intent to inflict
bodily harm." See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (ruling that circulating
"Wanted Posters" of doctors who performed abortions and posting their names on website
entitled the "Nuremberg Files" constituted a "true threat" outside the ambit of the First
Amendment); Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that publish-
ing an instructional book on murder that aids and abets a specific murder is not protected
speech under the First Amendment).
While a terrorist authorization does not involve threats to particular individuals, it
does constitute a direction to persons related to the speaker to take action. Cf Planned
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1076 (rejecting a contention that the true threat doctrine requires a
speaker's control of those who could harm the subject of the threat). In this sense, a
terrorist authorization is much closer to conduct punishable under conspiracy and other
traditional criminal law doctrines. This is particularly true where, as in the Stewart case,
the speaker is the leader of a group designated by the government for commission of
terrorist acts, and is at the time of the authorization imprisoned after being convicted of
conspiracy to commit such acts. See Indictment at 2-4 (describing the circumstances sur-
rounding Sheikh Abdel Rahman's imprisonment).
127. See HOFFMAN, supra note 42, at 94-95.
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targeting include Sheikh Abdel Rahman's fatwah to kill Jews or Rabbi
Meir Kahane's urging of his followers in the Kach group to kill
Palestinians.
128
The "signaling" account of the transformation of positional into
operational solidarity nevertheless raises clear problems with both the
First Amendment and our typical understanding of the lawyer's role.
The expression of political "positions" is after all what the First
Amendment protects. Under the First Amendment, the expression of
a position supporting or condoning violence is generally protected,
unless the government can prove that the speaker has the specific in-
tent to incite imminent illegal activity and such incitement is likely to
produce the desired action. 129 For example, the state could not pros-
ecute a speaker who shouts, "Death to Israel!" despite the speaker's
indication that she would approve of violent activities. 3 ' Generally, a
lawyer who echoed these sentiments, speaking on her own or on be-
half of a client, would similarly receive First Amendment protec-
tion. 13  Any other result would constrain the flow of ideas and
opinions that the framers deemed crucial to democratic self-
governance.1
3 2
This does not mean, however, that the First Amendment pre-
cludes limits on the authorization of violence or terrorist activity.
Statements preceding acts of violence can constitute incitement, if the
speaker intended violence to result and violence was an imminent and
likely consequence of her statements. 3 3 Moreover, the person issuing
the authorization can be so enmeshed in the planning of a particular
attack that he becomes a part of a criminal conspiracy. This was the
case in Sheikh Abdel Rahman's conviction on charges of conspiring to
128. See id. at 100-01. The Kach group has recently been implicated in a plot to bomb a
Palestinian girls' school in East Jerusalem. SeeJohn Kifner, Israel Arrests Settlers It Says Tried
to Bomb Palestinians, N.Y. TiMES, May 19, 2002, § 1, at 10. Ironically, one of Sheikh Abdel
Rahman's co-defendants, Sayyid Nosair, whom William Kunstler had successfully defended
on murder charges in state court, was convicted of conspiracy in the federal trial for his
role in the assassination of Kahane. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 148 (2d Cir.
1999) (per curiam).
129. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam).
130. See id.
131. See id. Lynne Stewart, for example, could not be prosecuted for her qualified en-
dorsement of violence in 1995. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Stewart's distinction between "directed" and "anarchistic" violence and her approval of
directed violence). Because her comments were so abstract, the court should also limit
their use as evidence in her pending case. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text
(analyzing evidentiary issues stemming from Stewart's prior public remarks on violence).
132. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49.
133. See id. at 447.
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bomb New York City landmarks.13 4 Attorney Lynne Stewart raised the
First Amendment without success, in the face of evidence on tape
demonstrating the Sheikh's participation in the planning process.
1 3 5
In addition, when the government designates an entity such as
the Islamic Group or Rabbi Kahane's Kach group as a terrorist organi-
zation because of its track record of violence against civilians or other
terrorist activity, federal prohibitions of "material support" for such
groups can regulate assistance in communicating terror authoriza-
tions.1" 6 Finally, the government can limit the communications of
prisoners convicted of committing terrorist acts, as long as it tailors
those limitations to avoid unnecessary interference with the attorney-
client relationship.'
37
IV. REGULATING ROLE BOUNDARIES IN THE REPRESENTATION OF
ACCUSED TERRORISTS
The material support and prisoner communication limits demar-
cate the boundary between a lawyer's positional and operational soli-
darity with clients. The validity and clarity of that boundary in these
two contexts is central to analysis of the regulation of lawyers repre-
senting persons accused of terrorist activity. This section addresses
those issues, and concludes with an examination of a crucial eviden-
tiary matter: the use, if any, that the government can make of an attor-
ney's prior statements of positional support for violence.
A. Material Support
Terrorist authorizations engender violence because they are not
merely speech in the arena of public debate. Terrorist authorizations
tread the boundary of speech and conduct. 138 Government efforts to
reach this type of conduct necessarily trigger tension with the First
Amendment and other constitutional guarantees such as the Sixth
134. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
135. See id. at 114-18 (holding that the federal seditious conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2384, does not violate the First Amendment). The court acknowledged that, "laws target-
ing 'sedition' must be scrutinized with care to assure that the threat of prosecution will not
deter expression of unpopular viewpoints by persons ideologically opposed to the govern-
ment." Id. at 116. However, the court concluded, "the [g]overnment, possessed of evi-
dence of conspiratorial planning, need not wait until buildings and tunnels have been
bombed and people killed before arresting the conspirators." Id.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (Supp. 2002).
137. See Bureau of Prisons, General Management and Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3
(2002).
138. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text (explaining that speech with the
intent to threaten harm can be reached by the courts without violating the First
Amendment).
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Amendment right to counsel. The nesting of the attorney-client rela-
tionship within constitutional protections ensures that such tensions
will permeate efforts to regulate lawyers representing accused or con-
victed terrorists.139 However, when lawyers stray from tasks necessary
for representation, their conduct enters the realm of material support
for terror in which constitutional protections have far less
applicability.
In the terrorism context, speech becomes conduct through inter-
action with an organizational infrastructure built to respond to the
authorization.1 40 Congress has sought to disrupt this infrastructure by
prohibiting "material support" for certain organizations that the gov-
ernment has identified as engaging in terrorist activity. 14' To discern
whether the material support prohibition can regulate lawyers' assis-
tance in the communication of authorizations of indiscriminate ter-
rorist activity, this section analyzes two interrelated issues: whether the
prohibition is consistent with First Amendment protections, and
whether the terms of the prohibition are unconstitutionally vague.
1. Material Support and the First Amendment.--Federal law prohib-
its the provision of "material support" to an organization previously
designated as a terrorist organization by the Secretary of State.1 42 To
designate an organization, the Secretary of State must find that the
organization has engaged in terrorist activity. 143  Terrorist activity
may, as in the case of the Islamic Group, Hamas, or Kach, include
lethal attacks on civilians.1 44 Material support includes funding "train-
ing," "expert advice or assistance," "communications equipment,"
"personnel," "transportation," and "other physical assets. "145
139. See Green, supra note 84, at 328 (discussing the tension between the norms of the
legal profession and a lawyer's criminal conduct within the context of the attorney-client
relationship).
140. Cf Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (explaining that speech can fall
outside the First Amendment protection if a reasonable speaker believes the listener will
consider the statement a threat).
141. See8 U.S.C. § 1189 (Supp. 2002) (providing authority to classify an organization as
a foreign terrorist organization); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (Supp. 2002) (making it a federal
offense to provide material support to terrorists).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
143. See8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (granting the Secretary of State the power to designate an
organization as a foreign terrorist organization).
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (I). The Secretary of State designated the Islamic
Group a terrorist organization in October 1997. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organi-
zations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997).
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b). Funding includes "currency or monetary interests or
financial securities, [and] financial services." Id. Material support also includes providing
"lodging, . . . false documentation or identification .... facilities, weapons, lethal sub-
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Courts have employed a form of intermediate scrutiny to deter-
mine that the material support prohibition is an incidental restriction
that does not violate the First Amendment.1 46 They have noted that
the material support prohibition clearly implicates an important gov-
ernmental interest: cutting off access to financial, technical, and
human capital by transnational organizations that engage in terrorist
activity.1 47 The material support prohibition also does not target pro-
tected political speech-it does not bar praise of terrorist activity,
148
but only the conduct involved in offering material aid to organizations
that engage in such activity.14 Finally, the investigational and infor-
mational challenges to direct regulation posed by the transnational
dimension of terrorist organizations make the prohibition of material
support necessary. 5 ° The difficulty of enforcing direct prohibitions
against terrorist acts on a transnational scale suggests that a ban on
material support may be crucial to deter future violence.1"'
stances, [and] explosives". Id. Excepted from the definition of material support are
"medicine or religious materials." Id The ban on "expert advice or assistance" was added
as part of the USA Patriot Act in the Fall of 2001. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 806(2)(B), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (Supp. 2002)). This
provision is not at issue in the Stewart case, although it may become relevant in future
cases. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text (discussing "expert advice or assis-
tance" and other statutory terms).
146. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2002); Humanita-
rian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904
(2001); see also Neuman, supra note 42, at 329-30 (concluding that the material support
prohibition likely complies with the First Amendment). But see Cole, supra note 51, at 205-
06 (arguing that material support prohibition violates freedom of association).
147. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135-36. Congress took care to explain its
compelling interests in controlling terrorism. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301 (a) (6), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (presenting Con-
gress's finding that "some foreign terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups
or individuals, raise significant funds within the United States, or use the United States as a
conduit for the receipt of funds raised in other nations"); 142 CONG. REC. S3453, S3464
(April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Brown) (asserting that the material support provisions
will allow the government to "begin to crack down on the use by terrorist groups of inter-
national financial institutions and front companies").
148. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133. The statute also preserves the right of
any person in the United States to criticize policies of the United States government and
regimes, such as President Mubarak's in Egypt, that lend support to those policies. See id.
149. Id, at 1136-37.
150. See Neuman, supra note 42, at 330-31.
151. Professor Neuman explains:
Foreign organizations differ from domestic organizations in the degree to which
the federal government has the capacity to control their actions directly. The
United States has limited ability to enforce anti-terrorist legislation against for-
eign organizations that are based in countries with which the United States has
amicable relations, and even less ability to enforce it against organizations that
are based in hostile countries.
Id. at 331.
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The transnational element has also led courts to uphold the ma-
terial support prohibition in cases where there is no apparent nexus
between the unit of the designated organization that received support
and the killing of civilians or commission of other terrorist acts. 15 2
According to courts, Congress could reasonably find that the transna-
tional scale and serpentine accounting of terrorist organizations make
it impossible to accurately trace human or financial capital. 153 Under
the circumstances, courts have ruled, Congress could bar all contribu-
tions as a prophylactic measure.
1 54
Since the communications alleged in the Stewart indictment con-
cern the killing of civilians, material support of such core terrorist ac-
tivity is a fortiori outside the scope of the First Amendment. 55 The
material support prohibition could constitutionally apply to discus-
sion, public or private, by members of a designated organization or
those in their employ or under their control about operational issues,
such as the status of a "cease-fire." 156 It would also cover public decla-
rations like Sheikh Abdel Rahman's fatwah that authorized violence
against specific groups, such as Americans, Jews, or Palestinians. 157
2. Material Support, Human Capital, and the Vagueness Doctrine.-
Even if a prohibition of material support is consistent with First
Amendment rights, the terms of the prohibition may be unconstitu-
tionally vague. Due process requires that a statute be "sufficiently
clear so as to allow persons of 'ordinary intelligence a reasonable op-
portunity to know what is prohibited.' "a5 A statute containing terms
that are too vague to pass this test does not provide adequate notice to
the public.'15  It also may chill the exercise of fundamental rights,
such as those guaranteed by the First Amendment, and may en-
152. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1027 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Congress narrowly tailored the designation process for "terrorist organizations" and prohi-
bition of funding rather than membership in such organizations).
153. Id. at 1027; Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136. In addition, courts have
reasoned that putatively "humanitarian" projects of designated organizations, such as spe-
cial aid to the families of suicide bombers, can materially facilitate terrorist acts. Humanita-
rian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136.
154. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1027; Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136.
155. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (upholding
a prohibition on speech that criminalizes advocacy of specific acts of force against the
United States).
156. See id.
157. Id
158. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146
F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998)).
159. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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courage arbitrary enforcement. 60 Given the importance of legal rep-
resentation for the viability of constitutional rights,16' possible
interference with legal representation should trigger a searching in-
quiry on vagueness grounds.
Vagueness analysis has centered on the statutory terms in the ma-
terial support prohibition that deal with the provision of some forms
of human capital.162 The provision of human capital, such as exper-
tise, is not, in principle, distinct from the provision of financial sup-
port or tangible items such as explosives. 163 Terrorist organizations
need services and expertise as much as they need financial support. 164
A ban on the provision of various forms of human capital thus serves
the legislature's purpose of disrupting the activities of terrorist organi-
zations. 165 However, to pass muster under a vagueness analysis, a stat-
ute should yield a reasonably clear construction of prohibited
conduct, including: (1) the nature of the human capital, and (2) the
relationship between contributors of human capital and the desig-
nated organization.166 If the statute is not susceptible to a clear con-
struction, courts will use the vagueness doctrine to ensure that the
statute does not chill protected activity. 1 67
Consider first a term added to the definition of "material sup-
port" in 2001: expert advice or assistance.' 68 Congress clearly could
prohibit a wide range of expert advice or assistance, including assis-
tance on munitions or logistics. However, expert advice or assistance
160. Id.
161. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits application of anti-solicitation rules to lawyers seeking plaintiffs in litigation to
establish civil rights).
162. Courts may strike down an entire statute as void-for-vagueness, or hold that one or
more of its terms are vague as applied. Courts have been unwilling to invalidate the mate-
rial support provision as a whole on vagueness grounds, reasoning that its core prohibition
on financial support provides sufficient clarity. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding in relevant part that only the AEDPA terms
"training" and "personnel" were impermissibly vague), affd, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). Presumably for the same reasons, the terms dealing with
specific, tangible commodities, such as "explosives," have not been the subject of vagueness
challenges.
163. See generally Margulies, supra note 37 (discussing the importance of human and
social capital to organizational development).
164. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. 2002) (defining material support as currency or mon-
etary instruments, expert advice or assistance, and personnel).
165. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 301, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (asserting that Congress's purpose in enacting AEDPA was to
prevent resources and support from going to foreign terrorist organizations).
166. See Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
167. Id.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
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could also include: a lawyer litigating whether the government should
designate a group as a terrorist organization, defending the group's
leader against criminal charges, or challenging the conditions of con-
finement for a convicted organizational official.' 69 Such an expansive
definition would undermine First and Sixth Amendment protections,
and mandate a solidarity with the state that is inconsistent with the
lawyer's role in a democracy. Courts should respond to this kind of
governmental overreaching by finding the statute unconstitutionally
vague as applied.'70
Similarly, the term "personnel," which constitutes prohibited ma-
terial support under the AEDPA, would be vague if applied to persons
who merely advocate views similar to those of a terrorist organiza-
tion.17 ' A person who publicly declares, "I support the goals and
methods of Kach," but has no functional role in the organization,
could be considered "personnel" in the broadest sense. 172 This per-
son is expressing a viewpoint protected under the First Amendment.
In contrast, the Constitution would allow the government to apply the
169. One allegation in the indictment involves representations by Stewart and her co-
defendants regarding the Sheikh's confinement. According to the Government, Stewart
counseled Sattar in a telephone conversation that it was "safe" to misrepresent to the pub-
lic that prison administrators were denying medical care to the Sheikh, while they knew
that in fact the Sheikh was refusing insulin for his diabetes. Indictment at 18. The Govern-
ment argues that this alleged "[d]issemination of [a] [f]alse [c]laim" was an attempt to
spread propaganda, and thus constituted material support of a terrorist organization. Id.
at 10-11, 18-19. Even taking the Government's allegations as true, vagueness problems
counsel strongly against criminalizing this kind of conduct. The Sheikh's confinement is
clearly a matter of public interest. Criminalizing statements about it, even willfully false
statements, would have the same chilling effect on free expression as criminalizing libel or
slander. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that
"[a]uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently re-
fused to recognize an exception for any test of truth"). Americans learned long ago, dur-
ing the heyday of the Alien and Sedition Acts, that this was a bad idea. Since the alleged
misrepresentations were not under oath, pejury, or a related charge is also not viable.
However, such statements might be an appropriate subject for professional discipline. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (1983) (defining "misconduct" to include be-
havior "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
170. Compare Pennsylvania v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (hold-
ing a state statute criminalizing "hindering prosecution" unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied to lawyers that retained possession of weapon given to them by a client who had
allegedly used the weapon in commission of a crime), with United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d
620, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the conviction of a lawyer for obstruction ofjustice
because he filed lawsuits to hinder the investigation of his client).
171. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
172. Id.
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term "personnel" to an individual employed by Kach or under its con-
trol who knowingly assists the organization. 173
Lawyers who use their professional status to facilitate and conceal
the communication of terrorist authorizations constitute "personnel."
Acting as a clandestine channel for such information connotes a de-
scent into the realm of operational solidarity well removed from the
lawyering tasks of drafting, argument, direct and cross-examination,
and even counseling that the Constitution protects.' 74  In Stewart's
173. Since the "direction or control" standard matches the dictionary definition of "per-
sonnel," the statute arguably incorporates this construction by implication. See II THE NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 2172 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993) (defining personnel
as "people employed in an organization. .. or engaged in a service or undertaking"). But
see Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16729, at *35-37 (C.D. Ca. Oct. 3, 2001) (arguing that the "direction or control" standard
in the United States Attorney's Manual is insufficient to cure vagueness as applied). As
with "expert advice or assistance," courts should not permit application of the term "per-
sonnel" to persons engaged in certain protected activities, such as legal representation in
criminal proceedings.
174. An attorney in this situation might seek to argue that her role as a counselor re-
quired her to stay the course, even as her client engaged in discussions involving the au-
thorization of violence against innocent persons. On this view, a lawyer must be "in the
room" when the client discusses ongoing illegal activity to persistently advise the client not
to so engage. A lawyer might even consider mounting a necessity defense, arguing that her
own illegal acts were necessary to temper the violent proclivities of her client and his
associates.
The facts in the Stewart case offer only modest support for such an account. The
Government does acknowledge that in March 1999 Stewart assisted Abdel Rahman in issu-
ing a statement from jail in support of a cease-fire. Indictment at 12. Unfortunately, ac-
cording to the indictment and the public record, Stewart subsequently used her access to
Sheikh Abdel Rahman to help communicate that he had changed his mind. Id. at 14-16.
Indeed, reports suggest that Stewart, through release of the Sheikh's position, took it upon
herself to intervene on the side of violence in an internal Islamic Group debate, in which
many group members in Egypt favored continuing to work with "civil society" to reform
the government. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, supra note 117.
The Government also alleges that Stewart's role as a conduit for information about
terrorist activities to and from the Sheikh involved providing material support in the form
of "communications equipment" and "transportation." Indictment at 11-12. The Govern-
ment asserts that Stewart made communications equipment available to the Islamic Group
when she conducted telephone calls which featured discussion of terrorist activity. Id. The
Government further asserts that Stewart provided transportation when, according to their
allegations, she brought the translator Yousry with her to Minnesota to see the Sheikh in
federal prison for the purpose of exchanging information about terrorist activity. Id. at 9.
Citing vagueness, Stewart has moved to dismiss, inter alia, the portions of the indict-
ment charging her with providing "communications equipment" and "transportation," as
well as "personnel" to the Islamic Group. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law Support-
ing Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Sattar, 02 CR 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at
www.lynnestewart.org. The vagueness challenge to the first two charges mentioned should
fail for the same reasons as the challenge to the charge of providing "personnel." See supra
notes 171-173 and accompanying text (discussing why "personnel" is not vague as applied
in the Stewart case). Regarding each charge, it would be "sufficiently clear . . . to . . .
'persons of ordinary intelligence'" that an individual under the direction or control of a
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case, for example, the Government alleges that Stewart facilitated
phone calls, written communications, and meetings regarding ongo-
ing terrorist activity by camouflaging these exchanges as attorney-cli-
ent interaction. 75 Given the Sheikh's exhaustion of appeals of his
conviction, the relationship of these exchanges to any actual legal
work performed by Stewart remains unclear.
Stewart's public transmission of Sheikh Abdel Rahman's terror
authorization at a news conference similarly involves an effort to shel-
ter communications about ongoing illegal acts under the advocate's
rubric.176 The government could apply the material support prohibi-
tion to a public declaration by a leader of a designated terrorist organ-
ization offering guidance to group members about future illegal
activity.177 The mere fact that the lawyer, due to the leader's unavaila-
bility, took up the mantle herself does not change the underlying
analysis.178 To hold otherwise would allow terrorist organizations to
effectively launder communications by using the lawyer as a public
conduit.
B. Conditions for Communication
The preceding analysis regarding the policing of the border be-
tween positional and operational solidarity also clarifies rules regard-
ing attorney communication with incarcerated clients. Stewart
undertook through an attorney's affirmation to accept conditions that
designated group could not knowingly provide communications modalities, such as tele-
phone calls, or transportation modalities, such as subsidized trips, to members of the or-
ganization for the purpose of discussing ongoing violent activity. See Foti v. City of Menlo
Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing the vagueness standard).
These alleged activities by Stewart raise ethical concerns, as well as issues about crimi-
nal culpability. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
vide that a lawyer "shall not.., assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983). If the Government
can prove that Stewart knew that the communications she arranged entailed discussion of
ongoing violence, this evidence also helps establish the requisite level of knowledge under
the ethics rules.
175. Stewart allegedly provided the terrorist organization with other "personnel" besides
herself. For example, according to the Government, she knowingly allowed Yousry, osten-
sibly employed as a translator for matters related to the Sheikh's legal representation, to
use attorney-client meetings and telephone calls to pass along information about terrorist
activities. Indictment at 12-14. Here, as elsewhere, of course, the Government must bear
the burden of proof at trial, for example, through demonstrating that Stewart, who does
not know Arabic, nonetheless had knowledge of the communications between the Sheikh
and the translator Yousry.
176. Indictment at 12-14.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (Supp. 2002); Brinkley, supra note 125 and accompanying
text (providing an account of the dynamics of terror authorizations).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
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precluded communication with third parties or the media.1 71 Re-
cently, even more onerous conditions, such as consent to monitoring
of attorney-client communications, have been challenged in cases in-
volving imprisoned terrorists. 80 Focusing on operational solidarity
offers a workable approach for assessing the validity of these
restrictions.
Courts have insisted that conditions that could impair inmates'
access to the courts be tailored to legitimate penological interests. If
the conditions fit a rational governmental interest not related to sup-
pressing the content of inmate speech, courts will also consider the
existence of alternative means of exercising the right available to in-
mates, the impact of exercise of the right on prison administration,
and the availability of less restrictive alternatives for achieving the gov-
ernment's objectives."' Courts seem most likely to approve attorney-
client communication restrictions that reflect an individualized assess-
ment of risks. For example, prison administrators can more readily
impose conditions on lawyers or legal workers who "pose [ ] some col-
orable threat to security" and on inmates "thought to be especially
dangerous."' 82 If a restriction, even one concerning the receipt of
legal advice, is consistent with prison administrators' assessment of
risk, the courts will typically defer to the administrators' expertise.183
Prisoners like Sheikh Abdel Rahman, who lead designated terror-
ist organizations and have been convicted of charges stemming from
terrorist activity, are appropriately subject to restrictions on contact
and communication. The restrictions on communication with third
parties or the media fit the legitimate interest of the government in
precluding the inmate's participation in planning or signaling future
terrorist attacks.'8 4 Such restrictions also reflect tailoring, by preserv-
179. See Indictment at 4-5, 23.
180. See Fainaru, supra note 82 (discussing lawsuits over government monitoring).
181. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229-30 (2001).
182. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420 (1974).
183. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 228-32 (declining to accord special First Amendment protection
to prisoner-to-prisoner legal communications).
184. The terrorist organization's claim that it has engaged in attacks to pressure the
government to release its leader simply buttresses the case for such restrictions. See Indict-
ment at 5-6 (describing the Islamic Group's statement after the Luxor attack); Weiser &
Worth, supra note 22 (quoting Stewart's translator and co-defendant, Mohammed Yousry,
as telling Sheikh Abdel Rahman that the attack on the U.S.S. Cole was designed to pressure
the government to release the Sheikh).
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ing the inmate's ability to consult with a lawyer about lawful methods
for securing release from incarceration."'
The government has ample grounds to prosecute lawyers who
knowingly and repeatedly violate such lawful restrictions after af-
firming in writing their willingness to comply. If lawyers regard condi-
tions on communication with incarcerated clients as onerous, they
should in a timely fashion contest the validity of the restrictions. 186
Evidence that a lawyer agreed to comply under penalty of perjury, 8 7
failed to challenge the conditions, and then repeatedly violated her
own undertakings in order to assist her client's illegal activity supports
an inference that the lawyer's initial affirmation was a false statement.
This kind of specific showing should also be a predicate for gov-
ernment monitoring of attorney-client conversations. The govern-
ment argues that monitoring is permissible in conjunction with a
screening process that would effectively bar access to monitored
materials by any prosecutors in the case.' 88 However, even with a
screening process in place, monitoring will adversely affect the quality
and utility of attorney-client communications. t89 Frank exchange, the
currency of attorney-client contact, will necessarily suffer if lawyers
and clients know the government is listening.'90 For example, con-
sider a client's decision about a matter that could ultimately benefit
antiterrorism efforts, such as cooperation with investigators. Clients
considering cooperation will be understandably unwilling to discuss
this possibility if they believe that the government will learn of their
185. See Bureau of Prisons, General Management and Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3
(2002) (allowing the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to create SAMs to protect against
future attacks that create the risk of death or serious bodily injury).
186. See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text (discussing legal standard for ad-
ministrative restrictions).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 2002) (making perjury and other false statements a
felony). The same evidence supports an inference that the lawyer has engaged in a con-
spiracy to defraud the government by impeding or impairing the government's ability to
control access to a prisoner in federal custody. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2002) (making it a felony
to conspire to defraud the United States).
188. See Fainaru, supra note 82. This process, analogous to a law firm's procedures to
screen out an attorney who had previously represented a party adverse to the firm's cur-
rent client, would involve a special team that could not share information from monitoring
sessions without a court order. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 15 (1983)
(discussing ways in which screening can yield an inference that lawyers in a current case
are not privy to information about a former client).
189. See Fainaru, supra note 82 (reporting that the new SAMs are having a chilling effect
on some attorney-client conversations).
190. Lynne Stewart observed that such monitoring has "almost a freezing effect on your
ability to defend the person .... the whole way we operate is to establish a relationship of
trust. You want to know everything that happened, and then you decide if the case is
defensible or not." Mansnerus, supra note 1.
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leanings through an audio-taped conversation with their lawyer,
rather than through the lawyer's careful presentation of a cooperation
agreement.
To the extent that monitoring impairs the lawyer's usefulness to
the client in pursuing entirely lawful objectives, it represents the kind
of enforced solidarity with the state that regulation in this area must
reject. Because of this concern, the mere fact that an inmate is incar-
cerated pursuant to a conviction for terrorist acts or has a history of
aiding terrorist groups is insufficient justification. Monitoring is only
appropriate where the government can demonstrate that less severe
restrictions, including restrictions on communication with third par-
ties or the media, have failed to prevent the client or lawyer from en-
tering into operational solidarity regarding ongoing illegal acts. 9 '
C. The Lawyer's Out-of-Court Statements as Evidence
A final problem is that the government will seek to prove opera-
tional solidarity through the lawyer's prior expressions of positional
allegiance, such as statements supporting resort to violence. In seek-
ing to use the lawyer's expressed positions against her, the govern-
ment risks prejudice to the defendant, and intrudes into both the
lawyer's efforts to define her professional identity and the domain of
political speech usually protected by the First Amendment.1 92 Courts'
evidentiary rulings should address these concerns.
Prior statements approving of or threatening violence are typi-
cally admissible if they are sufficiently specific to establish motive. 9
In a murder case, courts readily admit into evidence the threat, "The
191. Courts considering conditions imposed on access to counsel in recent terrorism-
related cases have split. Two courts apply a reasonableness test and one appeals court
allows the government to prohibit attorney-client communication based on the court's
minimalist view of the right of the petitioner to contest the alleged facts supporting his
detention as an unlawful combatant. See United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92-95
(D. Mass. 2002) (allowing defendant's lawyers and their staffs to consult with third parties
solely for the purpose of assisting with the defense); Padilla v. Bush, No. 02 Civ. 445, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086, at 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2002) (describing the government's
concern that detainee might pass messages to others through his attorney as "conjecture"
and "gossamer speculation"); cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002)
(vacating the District Court's order requiring the government to permit communication
between counsel and apparent United States citizen detained by the government as an
unlawful combatant in Afghanistan); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 02-7330, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 198 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2003) (declining to permit factual challenge of the govern-
ment's declaration that detainee was an unlawful combatant).
192. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1034, 1058 (1991) (stating that an
attorney's political speech is protected by the First Amendment).
193. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not prohibit evidentiary use of speech to show motive or intent).
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next time you do that, I'll kill you." '194 Statements about particular
groups may be admissible to show a defendant's motive in an alleged
hate crime.'95 However, in cases where the government alleges that
the defendant's motivation stemmed from political or religious views,
admission of such evidence could produce a verdict based on the
jury's opinion of those views, not on whether the defendant commit-
ted the crime charged.196
To guard against this risk, courts should carefully circumscribe
the use of such "advocacy evidence" in cases involving lawyers' posi-
tional solidarity with clients.1"7 As we have seen, general statements
supporting violence are not uncommon among lawyers who view
themselves as defending the unpopular. William Kunstler, in his auto-
biography, mused at length about how the killing of Rabbi Meir
Kahane, himself an advocate of violence, may have been a good
thing.'9 8 Lynne Stewart endorsed violence against oppressive institu-
tions, even as she condemned "anarchistic" violence as ineffective."99
The use of such statements as part of the government's case-in-chief
triggers tensions with the First Amendment and, in the post-Septem-
ber 11 climate, risks substantial prejudice to the defendant.
Courts should generally bow to these concerns and decline to ad-
mit generic evidence of positional solidarity with violence as part of
the government's case. To admit such evidence, courts should re-
quire that the government show an unambiguous nexus between the
views expressed and the crime charged. Suppose, for example, that
the communications within the Islamic Group that Stewart facilitated
had involved the assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak. A
court could regard as relevant and probative, and therefore admissi-
ble, Stewart's criticism of the Mubarak regime, coupled with her ap-
proval of "violence directed at the institutions which perpetuate
194. See id.
195. See id. at 486-87; Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coa-
lition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (stating that speech
does not become inadmissible to show context or intent simply because standing alone it is
protected); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(holding that the trial court properly admitted into evidence writings and speeches reflect-
ing hostility toward the United States as proof of motive for a conspiracy to bomb New
York City landmarks).
196. The trial court's instructions may help alleviate this concern. See Rahman, 189 F.3d
at 118 (noting the trial judge's instructions "that a defendant could not be convicted on
the basis of his beliefs or the expression of them"). It is not clear, however, that instruc-
tions can entirely obviate the risk of prejudice.
197. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1111 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
198. See KUNSTLER & ISENBERG, supra note 59, at 324 (stating "[i]n assessing the murder
of Meir Kahane, I'm not at all sure that it was not a blessing").
199. See Fried, supra note 43.
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capitalism, racism and sexism, and at the people who are the ap-
pointed guardians of those institutions. '" 20
0
Although Sheikh Abdel Rahman had previously been convicted
of seditious conspiracy to murder President Mubarak,2 °1 the Govern-
ment does not allege in the Stewart indictment a fresh plot against the
Egyptian President.20 2 Given this lack of unambiguous nexus, the
court should decline to admit evidence of Stewart's views. This ap-
proach balances the government's interest in proving the lawyer's op-
erational ties with the need to avoid prejudice to the defendant and
preserve the First Amendment protection accorded positional
solidarity.
V. LAWYERS' ROLES AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE OUTLOOK
FOR THE FUTURE
Striking the proper balance between government interests and
civil liberties is crucial in regulating the role of lawyers for persons
accused of terrorist activity. Any government action against a lawyer
undertaking the representation of unpopular clients can chill commit-
ments essential to democracy. At the same time, the law should pre-
vent lawyers from leveraging their professional status to pursue a
course of operational solidarity with terrorism that extends well be-
yond a lawyer's core functions. By developing a standard to guide
prosecutorial discretion, the government can deal effectively with
abuses and preserve lawyers' value to their clients and to democratic
governance. 203 A fair standard for prosecuting acts of operational sol-
idarity with terrorist activity should focus on: (1) notice to lawyers of
possible abuses; and (2) aggravating substantive factors, such as (a) a
pattern of wrongdoing, or (b) a clear nexus with violence. The follow-
ing paragraphs discuss these factors in turn.
A. Criteria for Prosecuting Operational Solidarity
1. Notice.-The provision of notice that a particular action con-
stitutes a sanctionable offense is a fundamental principle of democ-
racy, expressed in the Ex Post Facto Clause and the due process-based
200. Id. (quoting Lynne Stewart). Moreover, if a lawyer who had issued a more general
endorsement of violence testified that she deplored violence in all of its forms, the prose-
cution could clearly use her previous remarks for purposes of impeachment. FED. R. EVID.
801 (d).
201. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
202. See Indictment at 3.
203. For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining, see Fred C.
Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1121, 1149-81 (1998).
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contours of the vagueness doctrine. Courts considering sanctions
against lawyers have often paid special attention to this principle, im-
posing sanctions for actions such as violations of gag orders only after
repeated warnings. 2 4 To avoid a chilling effect on lawyers engaged in
lawful representation of clients, regulation of operational solidarity
with terrorist organizations should accord notice a special place.
Notice to lawyers can be actual or constructive. Actual notice is
superior, where practicable, as a method for avoiding unfair surprise
that can chill advocacy efforts. For example, after Lynne Stewart's an-
nouncement to the media of Sheikh Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of
support for the Islamic Group's cease-fire, the best practice for the
government may have been to notify Stewart that her conduct contra-
vened both the material support provisions of the AEDPA and the
SAMs governing the Sheikh's incarceration, and to inform her that
subsequent violations would trigger sanctions.20 5
In the Stewart case, however, the government could justify declin-
ing to provide actual notice on grounds of exigency. Such notice
could have "tipped" Stewart and her co-defendants to the surveillance
of their visits with the Sheikh for which the government had procured
a warrant, and jeopardized the broader investigation.20 6 Further-
more, constructive notice to Stewart was ample, reflected in the clear
language of the SAMs barring the Sheikh's direct or vicarious commu-
nication with the media, 2 7 and in the designation of the Islamic
Group as a terrorist organization that triggered the material support
prohibitions of the AEDPA.208 For lawyers seeking guidance after the
Stewart indictment about the location of the boundary between posi-
tional and operational solidarity, the presence of SAMs or a current
204. See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 829-31, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that disregard of the district court's repeated warnings showed willful intent of counsel to
violate the gag order).
205. Stewart asserts that she received such notice in July 2000 and agreed at that time to
comply with the SAMs. See Defendant Lynne Stewart's Notice of Motion for an Evidentiary
Hearing for Specific Performance and for Dismissal, at 12, 02 CR 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(JGK), available at www.lynnestewart.org/motionB.pdf. She further claims that the "consid-
eration" for her agreement to comply with the SAMs was the government's relinquishment
of the option to prosecute her. Id. Stewart acknowledges, however, that the government
did not agree to this in writing. Id. If these claims are correct and Stewart lived up to her
end of the agreement, then the Government should have declined to charge Stewart, as a
matter of prudence if not law.
206. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that "the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the
suspect").
207. See Indictment at 4.
208. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650 (Oct.
8, 1997).
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terrorist designation are indications that caution is appropriate in
communications regarding ongoing organizational activities.
2. Substantive Guides for Discretion.-
a. A Pattern of Wrongdoing.-Despite the notice provided to
an attorney, prosecutors should exercise their discretion to decline to
prosecute in cases involving isolated acts of operational solidarity.
Such acts may be the product of inadvertence or circumstance, and
may not reflect the degree of immersion in the client's ongoing ter-
rorist activities that threatens public safety or the integrity of the law-
yer's role. For example, if Stewart's only alleged offense had been her
announcement regarding the cease-fire, prosecutors may have been
best advised to decline to prosecute.
Prosecutors should focus on cases involving a pattern of viola-
tions. The existence of a pattern is the best indication that the law-
yer's conduct is willful, and warrants attention for the sake of both
public safety and the integrity of the legal profession. Requiring a
pattern also guards against the possibility that prosecutors will indict
lawyers whose alleged criminal conduct is difficult to separate from
constitutionally protected activity, such as investigation of a case pend-
ing trial that involves communication with members of a designated
organization about alleged past acts.
In Stewart's case, a pattern seems to emerge from the conjunc-
tion of her media announcement regarding the cease-fire with two
additional courses of conduct: (1) her alleged engineering of the pass-
ing of messages regarding ongoing violence between the Sheikh and
his cohorts during her visits to the Sheikh in federal prison, and (2)
her continued provision of personnel to the Sheikh, such as the ser-
vices of the co-defendant Yousry as a translator, after Yousry's alleged
communication to her of a message not to disavow the fatwah di-
recting the killing ofJews. 20° If the evidence does not support both of
these additional allegations, the charges against Stewart, while legally
sufficient to support an indictment, may not constitute an appropriate
exercise of discretion.
b. A Nexus with Acts of Violence.-Even in the absence of a
pattern, however, an act of operational solidarity with terrorist activi-
ties should be the subject of prosecution if the evidence demonstrates
that the act had a clear connection to a subsequent act of violence.
209. The message about the fatwah confirmed, if there had been any lingering doubt on
Stewart's part, that her co-defendants were actively seeking to promote ongoing violence
against civilians.
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For example, if a terrorist authorization communicated by an attorney
was followed immediately by an attack by members of a designated
terrorist organization represented by that attorney, prosecution would
be appropriate. In Stewart's case, the Government may not be able to
demonstrate such a nexus, despite the alleged assertions by Stewart's
co-defendant Yousry that the attack on the U.S.S. Cole was designed to
build pressure to free the Sheikh.21 ° A nexus with violence is not le-
gally required to prove violations of the AEDPA or the SAMs.21' Nev-
ertheless, in the absence of a pattern, the government should view a
nexus with violence as a threshold criterion for the decision to
prosecute.
B. The Lawyer's Role Redux
Such a nuanced approach will not materially impinge on the law-
yer's constitutional role, and may enhance the lawyer's service to cli-
ents accused of terrorist activity. A measured approach creates a safe
harbor for lawyers who perform core constitutional tasks, such as the
defense at trial of unpopular clients. The investigation, examination,
argument, and counseling central to such tasks remains in a realm
largely immune from government intrusion. Public aspects of such
tasks, including generic expressions of positional solidarity with vio-
lence, also receive protection. Moreover, in addition to deterring
criminal conduct, measured regulation of the boundary between posi-
tional and operational solidarity will also yield benefits for clients.
At their best, lawyers can help clients cope with the fluidity of
human events. 2 12 In the political sphere in which expressions of posi-
tional solidarity issue, coping with transitions requires a repertoire of
responses. 213 Violence may be a necessary recourse in some dire situa-
tions, but it is rarely the only recourse available. Members of the Is-
lamic Group in Egypt understood this when they disputed Stewart's
announcement that Sheikh Abdel Rahman had withdrawn his support
for the cease-fire, and affirmed their commitment to forging coali-
tions within civil society. 2 14 To the extent that Stewart identified her-
self with the cause of a transition to democracy within Egypt, her
210. See Weiser, supra note 110.
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. 2002); Bureau of Prisons, General Management and
Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2002).
212. See Peter Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A
Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 698
(1994) (articulating the importance of a dialogue between attorney and client).
213. See Margulies, supra note 14, at 28-31 (discussing insights of transition theorists).
214. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, supra note 117.
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renewed call for violence on the Sheikh's behalf did little to advance
the goal she shared with the organization's members.
A lawyer whose counsel better reflected the constancy of change
in politics may have chosen a contrasting course-exploring with the
Sheikh the possibilities of peace. If the Sheikh had chosen this path,
the lawyer would have aided such an effort. If the Sheikh had de-
clined, the lawyer would have received a clear signal to either with-
draw from representation, or else limit her services to matters directly
involving the Sheikh's legitimate legal interests, such as collateral at-
tack of his conviction or advocacy regarding conditions of confine-
ment. Even if someone needed to urge the continuing importance of
violence, the lawyer's assumption of this role sounds in the key of
hubris, rather than professional judgment. Surely, unpopular defend-
ants need their lawyers' judgment as much or more than other clients.
By reclaiming this judgment from the seductions of violence, a mea-
sured approach to the regulation of operational solidarity serves cli-
ents as well as the public interest.
CONCLUSION
The Lynne Stewart case demonstrates that the always troubled
border between positional and operational allegiance is particularly
difficult to administer in an age of terror. A lawyer who ends up on
the operational side can facilitate the mass slaughter of innocents.
However, government attempts to regulate attorney ties with clients
can impose an equally problematic allegiance: solidarity with the state.
These twin risks create a dilemma for the legal system. The lawyer's
democratic role in checking government power counsels against un-
duly intrusive regulation of the attorney's relationship with a client
accused or convicted of terrorist activity. Indeed, in light of the risks
of regulation, some might favor a laissez-faire regime that left such
matters to each lawyer's conscience.
The difficulty with a laissez-faire regime resides in the close rela-
tionship of solidarity's virtues and vices. The classic trap of opera-
tional solidarity is set by solidarity's virtues: affective ties to an
unpopular client and positional ties to the client's goals of social re-
form. The trap is sprung when unreflective practice of those virtues
leads the lawyer-perhaps incrementally and imperceptibly-to the
vice of complicity. Conscience alone may not be a reliable guide in
avoiding such risks.
Courts and prosecutors can offer fuller guidance as they interpret
and apply recent measures such as prohibitions on material support
to terrorist organizations and limits on communication with incarcer-
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ated terrorists or terror suspects. Unreflective interpretation could
lead to the mirror image of solidarity's vices: intimidation of zealous
defenders, blanket surveillance of attorney-client conversations, and
other indicia of enforced solidarity with the state. Democracy de-
serves more care.
A nuanced approach by courts would use the vagueness doctrine
to protect core lawyering functions, require individualized showings
for surveillance, and exclude prior statements of positional solidarity
with violence that lacked a specific connection to the offense charged.
Prosecutors would exercise their discretion by providing actual notice
of possible violations whenever practicable and focusing on patterns
of wrongdoing or a nexus with subsequent violence. A nuanced ap-
proach to regulation of the uneasy border between positional and op-
erational solidarity can guard against lawyers' complicity with terror
while preserving the independence of lawyers from government
coercion.
